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   Taking History Seriously:   Reflections on a Critique of Amar’s Treatment of the  
 Ninth Amendment in His Work on the Bill of Rights 
 Thomas B. McAffee* 
 
 Introduction 
 
 The contemporary debate over modern textualism1 has prompted some to question 
whether a “close reading” of constitutional text – of the sort engaged in by textualism’s 
proponents – can be an adequate guide to original meaning.2  Advocates of textualism, in an 
effort to obtain the original public meaning, or understanding, of constitutional text, “closely 
parse the Constitution’s words and grammar and the placement of clauses in the document,” 
 
*Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.  
The author thanks Tyler Watson for excellent research assistance.   
 
1See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621 (1990) 
(coining the phrase and reviewing the theory both critically and historically); Nicholas S. 
Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597, 
1599 (1991) (describing textualism as “a reaction against the legal process theory set forth by 
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks”).  An important scholarly proponent of textualism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation is Yale Law School’s Akhil Amar, a fact that prompted the 
publication of a legal symposium dedicated to exploring the implications of his book on the Bill 
of Rights to the project of interpreting the Constitution.  See Symposium: Textualism and the 
Constitution, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1061-1373 (1998).   
 
Dean Treanor observes that both Justices Scalia and Thomas “champion this interpretive 
approach,” along with “a cadre of influential academics, Akhil Amar most prominently among 
them.”  William Michael Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original 
Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 487, 487 (2007) [hereinafter 
cited as Taking Text too Seriously].  
 
2Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1.  Textualism refers to “the school of 
thought that seeks to construe the Constitution in accordance with the original meaning of the 
text.”  Id. at 496.  It requires “a search for the public meaning of the text at the time that text was 
written and ratified,” as contrasted with originalism’s “search for the subjective intent of 
particular sets of historical actors.” Id.   
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assuming “that this close parsing recaptures original meaning.”3  In a recent article, Dean 
Treanor suggests that “perhaps because it seems obviously correct, that assumption has neither 
been defended nor challenged.”4   The alternative view, and the one offered by Dean Treanor, is 
that a careful review of the history leading to the adoption of the language at issue, and even of 
the “drafting history,” often is essential to the discovery of the original understanding of the 
text.5  Textualism is not invariably the best way to find the original meaning. 
 Perhaps Dean Treanor’s most important, and seemingly compelling, illustration of this 
fundamental critique of textualism relates directly to Professor Amar’s interpretation of the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments in his well-known book, The Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction.6  Treanor offers a number of reasons to think that Amar placed undue weight on 
the placement of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments together, at the end of the Bill of Rights, 
while neglecting the evidence revealing that referring to the rights of “the people” was often a 
way to speak of purely individual (as contrasted with collective) rights.7  The purpose of this 
article is to embrace the basic critique of textualism presented by Dean Treanor, agreeing that 
sometimes text can accurately be understood only in the context of the history that produced that 
 
3Id. at 487.   
 
4Id.   
 
5Id.   
 
6Professor Amar’s treatment of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as the “Popular 
Sovereignty Amendments” is found at pp. 119-133 of his 1998 book.  Dean Treanor focused 
attention on Professor Amar because “[a]s the preeminent textualist scholar, Amar is an 
appropriate representative of the methodology.” Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 
1, at 492.   
 
7Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 508-519. 
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text; at the same time, this article will defend the view that Akhil Amar properly read that history 
as revealing the Ninth Amendment as designed to secure the other rights retained by virtue of the 
enumerated and limited powers scheme we call our federal system.   
 In Part I that follows, I sketch out Dean Treanor’s criticism of Amar’s treatment of the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the grounds on which he concludes that it illustrates the 
pitfalls of constitutional textualism.  Parts II through VI reviews: (1) the history leading to the 
adoption of the Ninth Amendment (Part II); (2) the conventional objection to reading the Ninth 
Amendment as being, like the Tenth, a federalism-rooted provision (Part III); (3)  the relation of 
natural rights and constitutional positivism to the Ninth Amendment (Part IV); (4) the Ninth 
Amendment and post-adoption evidence; (5) the relation between the Ninth Amendment and 
modern positivism (Part V).  The materials reviewed demonstrate that a close reading of the 
constitutional text must be aided by a reading of that text in historical context.   But when read in 
historical context, it becomes quite clear that the framers did not intend to impose unenumerated 
fundamental rights, even on the national government.   
 I.  
 Summarizing the Critique of Amar on the Ninth Amendment 
 
 
 By contrast to Treanor’s preferred approach, although Amar  manages to not completely 
ignore the “drafting history and textual usages outside the constitutional document,” he 
“relegates these evidentiary sources to secondary importance.”8  Instead, Amar ’s “central focus 
is on the text, and it is assumed that close reading yields original meaning.”9   Moreover, “the 
 
8Id. at 491.   
 
9Id.   
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Ninth Amendment is primarily concerned,” says Amar, “not with the protection of individual 
rights, but rather with the people’s right to alter or abolish government.”10  Hence the 
amendment’s language referring to “‘the people’ ha[s] a conspicuously collective meaning.”11 
  In Dean Treanor’s mind, Amar begins to go astray when “he stresses location” in 
analyzing the meaning of particular texts – “and in particular the fact that the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments are next to each other and should thus be read together.”12  Indeed, Amar  refers to 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments – even in the title of a chapter in his book – as “The Popular 
Sovereignty Amendments,” concluding that the Ninth “was ‘a federalism clause intertwined with 
the Tenth Amendment,’ and it ‘began as republican affirmation of collective rights of the 
people.’”13   The problem is that this  “assumes that location is a powerful guide to determining 
meaning and that meaning can be deduced from looking at the finished document rather than 
from probing drafting history.”14  But the location of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, as right 
“next to each other”in the federal Bill of Rights, “was a coincidence,” considering that Madison 
proposed amendments to be “inserted into the constitutional document, not added to the end.”15   
 
 
10Id. at 493.   
 
11Id.   
 
12Id.   
 
13Id. at 508 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR , THE BILL OF RIGHTS:   CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 119, 280 (1998) [hereinafter cited as CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION].) 
 
14Id. at 508-09.   
 
15Id. at 509.  Moreover, he reminds us, “the predecessors of the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendment were at very different places on [Madison’s] list of amendments.”  Id.   
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Treanor concludes: “They eventually wound up together because of a series of legislative 
decisions having nothing to do with a sense they were linked.”16  
 Madison’s proposed Ninth and Tenth Amendments would have been placed “at almost 
opposite ends of the document.”17  His Tenth Amendment “would have been combined with a 
separation-of-powers provision to form the penultimate article of the Constitution,” while his 
Ninth Amendment would have been “the final provision in a series of ten provisions that he 
sought to insert in Article I, Section 9 between Clause 3 and Clause 4.”18  These protected rights 
“followed the two clauses of the unamended Constitution that protect rights against 
congressional infringement–the suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause and the Bill of Attainder- 
Ex Post Facto Clause.”19   Treanor thus contends  that when the Ninth Amendment is “viewed in 
relation to the amendments that preceded them in Madison’s proposal, Madison’s Ninth 
Amendment clearly protected individual as well as group rights.”20  Treanor concludes that the  
 
 
16Id.   
 
17Id. at 514.   
 
18Id. at 514.   
 
19Id.  
 
20Id.  The question, of course, does not really concern whether the Ninth Amendment was 
intended to protect “individual rights,” but precisely how the protection was to occur.  Article II 
of the Articles of Confederation retained for each state “every Power, Jurisdiction and right, 
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.” 1  THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 86 (Merrill Jensen ed., 
1976) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION].  But that provision protected individual 
rights only indirectly by securing state control of those rights unless national jurisdiction had 
been expressly granted.  See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.   
 
  6 
                                                
 
“history of their evolution indicates that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not understood 
as a unit and that no one conceived of them as belonging together.”21   
  Dean Treanor acknowledges that “collective rights were part of the Ninth Amendment’s  
‘rights . . . retained by the people,’” but is emphatic that Amar’s claim that the amendment 
“began as a republican affirmation of collective rights of the people” is wrong “because it denies 
that the amendment was fundamentally concerned with the protection of  individual rights.”22  
Accordingly, Amar “ignores evidence of the demand for protection of individual rights, a 
demand that was at least as strongly pressed.”23    
 Thus, says Treanor, Amar fails even to discuss “the opening lines of” the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention’s resolution proposing amendments:    
That there be a Declaration or Bill of Rights asserting and securing from 
encroachment the essential and unalienable Rights of the People in some such 
manner as the following: 
 
FIRST, That there are certain natural rights of which men, when they form a 
social compact cannot deprive or divest their posterity, among which are the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing and 
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.24 
 
 
21Id. at 518. 
 
22Id. at 508. 
 
23Id. at 509. 
 
24Id. at 511-12 (quoting Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 
1788), in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST 
CONGRESS 17 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTARY RECORD].  Cf.   
3  THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 657-661  (J. ELLIOT 2d ed. 1866) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT’S DEBATES].   
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Virginia “thus opens with a request for an amendment recognizing ‘natural rights,’” which “are 
principally, if not wholly, rights of the individuals, not the group.”25  The same document “put 
these individual rights on a list of ‘the essential and unalienable Rights of the People.’”26 
Treanor also reminds us that New York – “the other state whose ratification history Amar 
invokes – also proposed a series of constitutional amendments sounding in natural rights, 
although it is omitted from Amar’s account.”27   As with Virginia, in New York we gather, says 
Treanor,  that “the state ratifying convention was seeking protection of individual rights.”28 
 What all this ultimately means, Treanor tells us, is that Amar never acknowledges that the 
amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions “reflected the usage under which 
individual rights were rights of the people.”29  So he emphasizes the right to alter and abolish 
government even as he completely ignores the “proposed amendments regarding the natural right 
to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.”30  “The evidence indicates,” moreover, “that individual 
 
25 Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1,  at 512.   
 
26Id. (quoting Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, in DOCUMENTARY 
RECORD,  supra note 24, at 17.).    
 
27Id.    
 
28Id. at 513.  Treanor notes that “New York also requested an amendment in which the 
individual right to conscience was formulated as a ‘right’ of the ‘People.’” Id. (quoting 
Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in DOCUMENTORY 
RECORD,  supra note 19, at 21.)  He concludes: “As in Virginia, the New York Ratifying 
convention considered an individual right to be a ‘right’ of the ‘People.’” Id.  For the view that 
the proposed New York amendment most closely related to the Ninth Amendment was combined 
with the proposed amendment that eventually became the Tenth Amendment, see infra note 51 
and accompanying text. 
 
29Id.  
 
30Id.   
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rights were at least as much the subject of the Ninth Amendment as the collective rights that are 
the sole focus of Amar’s analysis.”31  Amar thus “ignores evidence of the demand for the 
protection of individual rights, a demand that was at least as strongly pressed” as “the demand 
for protection of the popular right to change governments.”32   
 Treanor tracks with Professor Barnett in attributing the Ninth Amendment to a draft by a 
member of the House Select Committee, Roger Sherman, and in particular his proposed Second 
Amendment that sought to secure “certain natural rights.”33    Yet he acknowledges that 
Madison’s original proposal referred both to not construing “exceptions” in favor of rights to 
diminish “the just importance of other rights retained  by the people,” but also to not construing 
those exceptions to  “enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution;” instead, the exceptions 
should be construed as “either actual limitations on such powers, or as inserted merely for greater 
 
31Id.  
 
32Id. at 509.   It is at this point that Treanor cites the article by Professor Barnett that 
reads the Ninth Amendment both as providing for the protection of “individual rights as well as a 
narrow construction of the powers of the national government.”  Id., citing, Randy E. Barnett, 
The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2006) [hereinafter cited as The 
Ninth Amendment].   Interestingly, however, Professor Barnett is an advocate of textualism and 
is far more interested in the “public meaning” of the founders’ language than in their “intended” 
meaning.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 
623 (1999) (clarifying that he does not advocate “original intentions” originalism, but only 
“original meaning” originalism that looks for how language would likely have been understood).   
His interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, moreover, is clearly not based on the legislative 
history that produced the amendment.    
 
33Roger Sherman, Proposed Committee Report (July 21-28, 1789), in Documentary 
Record, supra note 24 at 266, 268.  Treanor’s agreement that the Ninth Amendment was derived 
from a proposal of Roger Sherman is found at Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 2, 
at 516.  But see Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The 
Presumption of Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 U. CINC. L. REV. 
1499, 1557-1559 (2007) [hereinafter The Court Over the Constitution].  See infra note 109 and 
accompanying text  
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caution.”34  Treanor observes, but does not explain either the reasons for the changes or its 
implications, that “[t]he [House Select] Committee edited the proposal down to the first clause 
and tightened the text,” meaning that its rights language “was modified to become the entire 
proposal.”35   As one who has studied and written about the Ninth Amendment for over twenty 
years, I can say with some confidence that Amar’s treatment of the Ninth Amendment relates 
more directly to the ratification-era debate that produced the amendment than the account 
supplied by Dean Treanor. 
 II. 
 The Debate Over the Omission of a Bill of Rights 
  
 It is quite clear that the Ninth Amendment came to us because of the ratification-era  
debate over the omission of a bill of rights. 36  The Federalists defended that decision by 
invoking the precedent of the Articles of Confederation and its omission of any bill or 
declaration of rights.37  While the state constitutions “started with a presumption in favor of 
 
34Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 514-515. 
 
35Id. at 516. 
 
36E.g., Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 7 (“During the ratification 
debates over the Constitution, the principal objection made by its opponents that resonated with 
the public was the absence of a bill of rights.”).   
 
37See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and American 
Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated Rights, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 747, 751 (2001) [hereinafter cited as Inalienable Rights] (noting that Madison in 
The Federalist No. 38 posed the question whether a Bill of Rights is “essential to liberty,” and 
answered the inquiry by referring to the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Articles of Confederation).  
THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE, & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED FOR THE 
PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 29 (2006) 
[hereinafter cited as POWERS RESERVED] (noting that defenders of the proposed Constitution 
“relied on the example of the Articles of Confederation–a document with limited and enumerated 
powers that generated no opposition from those interested in securing basic rights”). 
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government power,”38 the framers of the federal Constitution began with the opposite 
assumption: while in the states “everything which is not reserved is given,” under the proposed 
Constitution “everything which is not given, is reserved.”39  The debate over the omission of a 
bill of rights, then, for the Federalist proponents of the Constitution, turned on the distinction 
between a government of “general” legislative powers, as held in the states, and a government of 
“enumerated” legislative powers, as would be held by Congress.40   
 
38McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 751.    
 
39James Wilson’s Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at  388.  The elaborate argument included this: 
 
When the people established the powers of legislation under their separate 
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and authority 
which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore upon every question, 
respecting the jurisdiction of the house of assembly, if the frame of government is 
silent, the jurisdiction is efficient and complete.  But in delegating federal powers, 
another criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority is to 
be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive grant expressed in 
the instrument of union.  Hence it evident, that in the former case [of the states] 
every thing which is not reserved is given, but in the latter [case of the federal 
Constitution] the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything which is not 
given, is reserved.   
 
Id.  Where “every thing which is not reserved is given,” id.,  a bill of rights is needed so that 
essential rights are retained.  See infra note 200 and accompanying text (James Iredell 
recognizing necessity of a bill of rights as to a government of general legislative powers).  
 
40By contrast, Professor Barnett insists that the legislative power even of the states was 
limited by the rights “retained” as individuals left the state of nature and joined the social 
contract–though apparently not initially as a matter of federal constitutional law.  See Randy E. 
Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 433 (2004) 
(concluding that “the unlimited or plenary power construction of the police power is inconsistent 
with both the text and original meaning of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments”).   
Considering that Barnett acknowledges that neither the federal Bill of Rights, nor the Ninth 
Amendment, acted in any way to limit the states’ police powers, one can only imagine that 
Barnett simply assumes that the natural liberty rights he takes as “retained” by the Ninth 
Amendment would equally serve to limit state legislative police powers–at least as a matter of 
  A significant problem was that the Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution did not 
accept the idea that the Constitution created a government of limited, defined powers, rather than 
one of “general” powers.  Thus Thomas Jefferson, who supported adding a Bill of Rights, 
responded to Wilson’s argument from enumerated powers by noting that the proposed 
Constitution omitted Article II of the Articles of Confederation, or an equivalent provision.41   
Article II had provided that each State “retains every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not 
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States.”42   It was the importance of 
Article II in the minds of Antifederalist opponents of the Constitution that explains why the 
provision that eventually became the Tenth Amendment was proposed by every state ratifying 
convention that proposed an amendment.43   
 The reason that Madison’s reliance on the precedent of the Articles, as well as the 
Antifederalist insistence that the equivalent of Article II be placed in the Constitution, is so 
understandable, is precisely because Article II’s requirement that all not “expressly delegated”  
                                                                                                                                                             
state constitutional law–even if there is no text saying so.  That conclusion, of course, directly 
contradicts the views of state legislative power expressed by both sides of the ratification-era 
debate over the omission of a bill of rights.  See, e.g., supra note 34 and accompanying text.   
 
41Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, in 8 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 20, at 249-53 (Dec. 20, 1787).  To Jefferson it was apparent that all is not reserved “in the 
case of the general government which is not given,” as demonstrated “by strong inferences from 
the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present 
confederation which had declared that in express terms.” Id. at 250.   
 
421 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 86.   
 
43Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1215, 1242 (1990) [hereinafter cited as Original Meaning]; AMAR, CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 123. 
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would be “retained” by each State appeared as a perfectly plausible way to ensure the protection 
of rights.44  What is important to grasp, however, is that Article II secured rights not by setting 
forth affirmative limits on delegated powers – what the Federalists referred to as “exceptions” to 
granted powers and modern thinkers call “trumps” – but by making clear that the powers held by 
the Articles’ continental Congress were to be construed as strictly limited to those that had been 
explicitly delegated.45   
 What is often missed in understanding the ratification-era debate over the omission of a 
Bill of Rights is that the Federalist contention that a Bill of Rights was not only not necessary 
under an enumerated powers scheme, but would be “absurd and dangerous,”46 was based on the 
 
44Even some Antifederalist opponents of ratification of the proposed Constitution freely 
acknowledged that if the Constitution contained a provision that guaranteed that “every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which are not given up by it, remain in the states,” there would be no need 
for a bill of rights.  Samuel Spencer, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4  
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 163, 163.  Accord, A Review of the Constitution Proposed 
by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia 1787, by A Federal Republican, in 2 RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 303, 304-06 (stating that Constitution needed either a 
bill of rights or a declaration that all not “decreed to Congress” is reserved to states).    
 
45See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. 
Rev. 331, 356  (2004) [hereinafter cited as Lost Original Meaning] (describing Article II as 
having “distinguished the limited enumerated powers of the federal government from the 
unenumerated police powers of the states. Thus, all powers and rights not delegated to Congress 
were reserved to the people of the several states. The people of the states, in turn, may delegate 
those retained powers and rights to their own state government.”).   
 
46James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention, in 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 24, at 149.  Edmund Randolph argued in Virginia that as to an “ordinary legislature” with 
“no limitation to their powers,” a bill of rights might be necessary; but the “best security” in a 
compact “is the express enumeration of powers.”   3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 467 
(Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 15, 1788).  In his most recent major defense of his reading 
of the Ninth Amendment, Barnett simply skips any thought that Federalists feared undermining 
the structural protection of rights, claiming that the feared danger was simply that “all [the rights] 
that were not listed were surrendered,” and that the rights to be protected are “impossible to 
 risk that the setting forth of rights could be understood to reverse the decision that the national 
legislature was to be one of enumerated and limited powers47–a rights-protective structural 
scheme.48  Even an advocate of unenumerated fundamental rights has acknowledged that the 
Federalists “feared a Bill of Rights would imply that the federal government was a government 
of general powers rather than of limited, enumerated powers.”49   
 This is the reason that the Federalist argument was limited to stating the dangers of a bill 
                                                                                                                                                             
enumerate.”  Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 8.  
 
47James Wilson asserted that “[a] proposition to adopt a measure that would have 
supposed that we were throwing into the general government every power not expressly reserved 
to the people would have been spurned at, in that house, with the greatest indignation.”  2 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387-88 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania 
Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).   “The idea that an enumeration of rights was superfluous 
in a constitution of merely delegated powers was precisely the idea that Madison intended to 
express in the Ninth Amendment.”  Edward J.  Erler, The Ninth Amendment and Contemporary 
Jurisprudence, in The Bill of Rights: Original Meaning and Current Understandings 432, 436 
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., ed. 1990). 
 
48Madison linked the argument that a Bill of Rights was not necessary to the argument 
that it could prove dangerous when he summarized the Federalist defense in presenting his 
proposed Bill of Rights to Congress: 
 
It has been said, that in the Federal Government [declarations of rights] are unnecessary, 
because the powers are enumerated, and it follows, that all that are not granted by the 
Constitution are retained; that the constitution is a bill of powers, the great residuum being the 
rights of the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so necessary as if the residuum was 
thrown into hands of the Government. 
 
James Madison,  Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His Notes for 
the Amendment Speech, in 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED  BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND 
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 51, 59 (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989) [hereinafter RIGHTS 
RETAINED].     
 
49John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 Emory L.J. 967, 995 (1993). 
 
 13 
 of rights being added to “a government possessed of enumerated powers.”50 Thus when state 
ratifying conventions proposed amendments against interpreting rights (referred to as “clauses 
which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers”) to “extend the powers of 
Congress,” their purpose was to ensure the protection of rights by avoiding an inference of 
general legislative powers.51      
 Treanor is certainly right that it was almost a coincidence that the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments wound up “next to each other” in the Bill of Rights.52  At the same time, when he 
                                                 
502 Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 20, at 388 (James Wilson, Pennsylvania 
Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).  Wilson argued: “[W]hen general legislative powers are 
given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman's principle of government, 
retain nothing.  But in a government like the proposed one, there can be no necessity for a bill of 
rights. For, on my principle, the people never part with their power.” Id. at 470 (Dec. 4, 1787).  It 
was the existence of a federal government of enumerated powers that explains Madison’s fear 
that “enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power” would “disparage those which 
which were not placed in the enumeration,” and “those rights which were not singled out, were 
intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government.”  James Madison, Speech to 
the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His Notes for the Amendment Speech, in  
RIGHTS RETAINED. supra note 48, at 51, 60 (emphasis added).   Though acknowledging that 
Madison’s analysis was that this “is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged 
against the admission of a bill of rights into this system,” Professor Barnett treats Madison’s 
statement as though it were an argument against bills of rights in any constitution.  See Barnett, 
Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 9 (emphasis added).     
 
51See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 840-45 
(1971).   Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment read: 
 
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers, 
be not interpreted, in any manner whatsoever, to extend the powers of Congress; but that 
they be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be 
the case, or otherwise, as inserted merely for greater caution.        
 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21.   
 
52Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509.  The House Select Committee 
that decided to place the proposed amendments in a separate document, and not to insert them 
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asserts that “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were not understood as a unit and that no one 
conceived of them as belonging together,”53 it appears that he is simply wrong.54  As Professor 
Lash found: 
In the end, the Select Committee’s decision to place the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments side by side was prescient.  From the moment they were enacted 
(indeed, before), the two provisions were cited as expressing twin principles of 
federalism: limited and enumerated federal power.  Madison linked the two in his 
speech as dual guardians of state autonomy, and numerous treatise writers of the 
Founding generation did the same.55 
 
 And when Edmund Randolph objected to the “eleventh proposed amendment” (our 
Ninth) before the Virginia Assembly, he contended that the amendment should have been 
worded more like the “the 1st and 17th amendments proposed by Virginia.”56  Notice that even 
 
into the Constitution itself as Madison had proposed, also determined to place what became the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments next to each other.   
 
53Id. at 518. 
 
54See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA 
L. REV 801, 844 (2008) [hereinafter cited as Inescapable Federalism] (observing that “Madison 
used the Ninth Amendment in defense of state rights and did so in a manner that recapitulates the 
entire history of the Amendment, from its roots in the state conventions to its final placement 
alongside, and in tandem with, the Tenth Amendment”); id. at 54 (noting that “[t]here are 
literally hundreds of cases and commentaries linking the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin 
guardians of federalism”).        
 
55Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 396.   In perhaps the earliest 
commentary on the Constitution, Professor Tucker treats the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
together, after quoting each verbatim, and concludes that each calls for “every power” to be 
“construed strictly” for the benefit of the people and the states.  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, View of the 
Constitution of the United States, in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
SELECTED WRITINGS 245-46 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999) (1803) [hereinafter cited as VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION].  
 
562 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 1188.   Randolph’s argument is excerpted and then 
carefully analyzed at McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1287-1293.  The Virginia 
 these amendments were widely separated, as were Madison’s proposed Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments before Congress, but Randolph’s argument makes clear that they were closely 
related in the minds of the framers.57   The closeness of that relationship is confirmed as well, 
quite strongly, by the amendment proposed by the New York Ratifying Convention, on July 26, 
1788.  
That the Powers of Government may be reassumed by the People, whensoever it 
shall become necessary to their Happiness; that every Power, Jurisdiction and 
right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of 
the United States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the 
People of the several States, or to their respective State Governments to whom 
they may have granted the same; and that those Clauses in the said Constitution, 
which declare, that Congress shall not have or exercise certain Powers, do not 
imply that Congress is entitled to any Powers not given by the said Constitution; 
but such Clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified 
Powers, or as inserted merely for the greater caution.58 
                                                                                                                                                             
proposed amendments present the functional equivalents of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  
Treanor would be wise to consider why Barnett interprets the Ninth Amendment both to secure 
individual rights and to justify “a narrow construction of the powers of the national government.”  
Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509.  Barnett’s advocacy of “narrow 
construction” of federal powers, to the end of protecting retained rights, implicitly admits that 
“rights” and “powers” are closely related and that a “federalism” reading of the Ninth 
Amendment has much to offer. Cf. Barnett, Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 17-21 
(endorsing a “federalism model,” not as a matter of “original meaning,” but as a valid 
“constitutional construction” that creates a presumption in favor of retained rights). But cf. infra 
note 68 and accompanying text (Barnett separating Ninth and Tenth Amendments as about 
“rights” and “powers”).    
 
57In a thorough analysis of the Virginia debate, including Madison’s correspondence with 
Hardin Burnley and George Washington, I observed that both Burnley, a member of the Virginia 
assembly who described the assembly debate to Madison, and James Madison, agreed with 
Randolph that the Virginia proposed amendment that became the Ninth Amendment was drafted 
as a “reservation against constructive power.”  McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 
1287-1293, 1288.  A useful treatment of the Virginia debate is found in Lash, Lost Original 
Meaning, supra note 45, at 371-78.   
 
58DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21-22.   Amar clearly grasped the relevance 
of this connection.  AMAR,  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 122.  See also  
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 The relatedness of the First and Seventeenth proposed amendments of the Virginia 
ratifying convention coincides as well with Madison’s statement that he could support a bill of 
rights “provided it be so framed as not to imply powers not meant to be included in the 
enumeration.”59  It is also shown by their placement in the Virginia ratifying convention’s 
proposed amendments.  Both of these amendments were not part of the Virginia convention’s 
proposed bill of rights.  One set of amendments, the convention stated, was to “be a declaration 
or bill of rights asserting, and securing from encroachment, the essential and unalienable rights 
of the people.”60  The First and Seventeenth proposed amendments were part of a separate 
section of Virginia’s proposed amendments, denominated AMENDMENTS TO THE BODY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION.61  Virginia’s First proposed amendment was worded very similarly to Article II 
                                                                                                                                                             
MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 36 n. 64 (New York 
proposal “confirms that the purpose of the Ninth Amendment . . . was to protect the enumerated 
powers scheme and to lend support to what became the Tenth Amendment”);  Lash, Lost 
Original Meaning,  supra note 45, at 355-56.  Unsurprisingly, James Wilson had actually labeled 
a bill of rights as “an enumeration of the powers reserved.”   James Wilson, 2 RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387, 388 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 
1787).   A suggested dichotomy between “rights” and “powers” provisions – as assertedly 
embodied in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments – seems repudiated by Wilson’s formulation.  For 
additional strong evidence that the proposed amendment’s reference to avoiding enlarged powers 
related directly to the debate over the dangers of adding a bill of rights, see Lash, Inescapable 
Federalism, supra note 54, at 817-23.   
 
59James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 614, 615 (Oct. 
17, 1788). 
 
60DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 17.   
 
61Id. at 19-21.   In another source these amendments are described as AMENDMENTS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION.  3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 659.  Cf. Jon Kukla, “Yes! No! And If 
. . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s “Federalists Who are for Amendments,” in 
ANTIFEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 43, 59 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992) 
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 of the Articles of Confederation, retaining “every power, jurisdiction, and right,” not “delegated 
to the Congress;” it eventually became the Tenth Amendment.62   Virginia’s Seventeenth 
proposed amendment forbad construing limits on powers as extending the powers of Congress, 
holding that they should be construed as “making exceptions for the specified powers” or as 
“inserted merely for the greater caution.”63 
 When Madison offered proposed amendments to the Constitution in the House of 
Representatives, moreover, he included all three types of proposals – (1)  one inspired by the 
Virginia Bill of Rights, sections 1 and 3, to be inserted in the preamble as a “prefix” to the 
Constitution64; (2)  one seeking to prevent an inference of “enlarged” powers or diminished 
                                                                                                                                                             
[hereinafter cited as ANTIFEDERALISM] (contrasting “a bill of rights and twenty structural 
changes”).   
 
62DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19.  
 
63DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21.  It is also true, of course, that Virginia’s 
seventeenth proposed amendment was responsive to Federalist arguments about the “danger,” or 
“absurdity,” of including a bill of rights in the Constitution; so it is unsurprising that Madison 
included this proposed amendment – described as a “reservation  against constructive power,” 
see text accompanying note 104 infra –  in Article I, section 9.  Virginia’s proposed amendment 
grew out of Hamilton’s objection, based on perceived dangers, to including a bill of rights.  See 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST  No. 84, at 579 (JACOB COOKE ED., 1961).  The Ninth 
Amendment is widely traced both to Hamilton’s argument and to Virginia’s proposed 
amendment.   McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1516-1519.  
Professor Barnett, however, would trace Hamilton’s argument exclusively to the Tenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 1517-18.  
 
64James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His 
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 51, 54.  For the 
prefix’s proposed content, see infra note 165 and accompanying text.  Cf. Va. Const. Of 1776, 
Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL 
CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR 
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3812, 3813 (Francis Newton Thorpe 
ed., 1909) [hereinafter cited as STATE CONSTITUTIONS].  Amar links the emphasis on the people’s 
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 rights, to be in article I, section 965; and (3) one seeking the inclusion of the functional equivalent 
of the Tenth Amendment, to be inserted at Article VI of the Constitution.66   The proximity of 
the language of Virginia’s state proposals to the texts we know as the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments is simply undeniable.67 
                                                                                                                                                            
 IV.   
 Rights and Powers  
 
 It is a common objection that if one construes the rights secured by the Ninth 
Amendment as referring to the rights defined by the enumerated powers scheme, such an 
interpretation “erroneously construes the Ninth Amendment to mean nothing more than what is 
stated in the Tenth.”68  The Tenth Amendment states “that powers not delegated are reserved.”69  
If the “rights” are defined by reference to what’s left over after you explicate the “powers,” the 
Ninth Amendment adds nothing.  Moreover, the “Tenth Amendment does not speak of rights, . . 
 
right to alter and abolish with analysis by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78.  See AMAR, 
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 122.  
 
65James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His 
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 51, 55.  
 
66Id. at 56.  
 
67For a close comparison, see Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 822-23.   
Lash notes that some contend that the language referencing powers “was moved to the Tenth 
Amendment,” but correctly concludes that “this clearly is not the case.”  Id. at 823.  “The powers 
to which Madison refers in his initial draft of the Ninth involved only the implied enlargement of 
enumerated powers.  This language was not moved to the Tenth; it simply disappeared.”  Id.    
 
68Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6  
(1988) [hereinafter cited as Reconceiving].   “By contrast,” Barnett observes, “the Ninth 
Amendment speaks only of rights, not of powers.”  Id.   
 
69Id. 
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 .  but of reserved ‘powers,’”70 and such an interpretation of the Ninth therefore directly violates 
Justice Marshall’s famous dictum that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, 
unless the words require it.”71   The traditional reading of the Ninth Amendment, on this view, 
posits that the amendment was “confusingly written in terms of ‘rights’ that are ‘retained by the 
people,’ to express exactly the same idea”72 stated in the Tenth Amendment.  The result is that 
this conception “renders the Ninth Amendment effectively inapplicable to any conceivable case 
or controversy.”73    
 Prior to addressing the objection directly, it is at least relevant, and worthy of comment,  
that Professor Barnett, who makes much of this redundancy objection, has adopted an 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause that is at least as redundant of his own 
construction of the Ninth Amendment as the traditional interpretation of the Ninth Amendment is 
of the Tenth.  At least since the early 1990's, Professor Barnett has embraced the view that it is 
“improper,” and therefore a violation of the power recognized in the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, for Congress to enact legislation that violated the “background rights” of the people.74   
                                                 
70Id.   
 
71Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).   Justice Marshall’s well-
known dictum is used as a heading at the very beginning of Barnett’s first important treatment of 
the Ninth Amendment.  Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68,  at 1.    
 
72Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 6.   
 
73Id.  
 
74Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 183, 217 (2003) [hereinafter cited as Necessary and Proper Clause].  Barnett fully 
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 More recently, Barnett has endorsed the idea that whatever rights are “retained” by the principle 
articulated in the Ninth Amendment, any law that “improperly” intruded on such a right would 
be a direct violation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.75  If Barnett’s interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is correct, it is not even clear why it was not prominently featured 
in the debate over the omission of a Bill of Rights; and, if it is correct, the Ninth Amendment 
clearly has no independent role to play in constitutional adjudication, since all the same rights are 
already secured by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
 More generally, if the redundancy objection has any merit, it did not impact the 
committee that drafted the Virginia ratifying convention’s first and seventeenth proposed 
amendments, as both were rules of construction that referred to both rights and powers.  
Virginia’s first proposed amendment, tracking the Confederation’s Article II, stated that each 
state retained “every power, jurisdiction, and right,” not “delegated to the Congress.”76  It’s 
seventeenth proposed amendment prohibited misconstruing rights limitations on federal powers 
                                                                                                                                                             
accepted the relatively stringent – and “rights-protective” –  construction of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause found in Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal 
Power:   A Jurisdictional Reading of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267 (1993) [hereinafter 
cited as The Sweeping Clause]. 
 
75Barnett, Necessary and Proper Clause, supra note 74, at 217-19.  Barnett attempted for 
a period to reconcile his strict reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause with his stated view 
that the rights “retained” by the Ninth Amendment are the natural rights people bring with them 
from the state of nature when they join the social contract; but his sporadically stated view that 
the people also “retain” fundamental positive rights has managed to “win out,” though to date 
without anything offered by way of justification. See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS 
RESERVED, supra note 37, at 62 n. 150 
 
76DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19 (emphasis added).  
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 as extending or enlarging the powers granted to Congress.77  The reason thoughtful people could 
think them both essential is that both provisions are cautionary guarantees to assure that the 
limited powers design of the Constitution was understood and implemented.78   
 Professor Lash concluded that Madison based his draft of the Bill of Rights “on the 
concerns emanating from the state ratifying conventions,” and that the state proposed 
amendments show “how those who ratified the Constitutions understood and used terms like 
‘powers’ and ‘rights.’”79  As the various state proposals indicated, the Ninth and Tenth 
amendments have separate histories and serve complementary functions.80  The Tenth 
Amendment grew out of expressed fears that the omission of such an explicit guarantee of 
                                                 
77The full text of Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment is found at note 48 supra.   
It is clear that clauses “which declare that Congress shall not exercise certain powers” is a 
reference to “rights” provisions, and they work as “exceptions” to powers whenever they operate 
to trump the exercise of granted powers.  When Professor Barnett contends that there is nothing 
in this proposal “about the rights of the people, collective or otherwise,” but instead relates 
exclusively to the “rights of states” – and is therefore unrelated to “the problem for which the 
Ninth Amendment was Madison’s solution” – it becomes clear that he simply does not 
understand how Virginia’s proposed amendments related to the debate over the omission of a bill 
of rights.  Randy E. Barnett, Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to A Textual-Historical 
Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 Stanf. L. Rev. 937, 950 (2008).   
 
78Amar is clearly right in asserting that the “obvious counterargument–chanted like a 
mantra by most mainstream scholars–is that this reading renders the Ninth Amendment wholly 
redundant of the Tenth.  But this obvious counterargument is obviously wrong, and no amount of 
chanting can save it.”  AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 123.   
 
79Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 355. 
 
80Their complementary functions explain why Professor Lash has observed that “every 
court and every scholar who addressed the Ninth Amendment in the first period of constitutional 
law read the Ninth in pari materia with the Tenth as one of the twin guardians of federalism.” 
Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 597, 643 (2005) 
[hereinafter cited as The Lost Jurisprudence].  
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 reserved powers, such as had been included in the Articles of Confederation, might raise the 
inference that general powers were intended.81   The Ninth Amendment, on the other hand, 
addresses the altogether different threat posed by the enumeration of specific limitations on 
government powers designed to secure individual rights.   The Tenth Amendment does not by its 
terms address any inferences which arguably flow from the enumeration of rights in the 
Constitution.   Moreover, constitutional law scholars have in recent years underscored that the 
“anti-redundancy” presumption should be formulated as an “anti-nullity” presumption,82 
recognizing that “redundancy in legal documents is not particularly odd,” especially when “the 
drafting history of the Bill of Rights explains the presence of both provisions.”83   
 Nor is it correct that under its traditional interpretation the Ninth Amendment “is 
rendered irrelevant to any conceivable constitutional decision” and thus lacks “any potential 
application.”84  If the government contended in a particular case that it held a general power to 
regulate the press as an appropriate inference from the First Amendment restriction on that 
power, or argued that it possessed a general police power by virtue of the existence of the bill of 
rights, the Ninth Amendment would provide a direct refutation.  Indeed, the Federalist 
predictions in fact occurred, as there are examples early in the nation’s history of arguments for 
                                                 
81McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1307.   
 
82Akhil Reed , Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1, 3 (1998).   
 
83Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 271 (1988).  
 
84Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 6.   
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 enlarged federal powers being based on the explicit statements of limitations found in the federal 
Bill of Rights.85    
 It is significant, moreover, that one who opposes reading the Ninth Amendment as an 
attempt to secure the rights protected by the enumerated powers scheme, and who contends that 
the Tenth Amendment is about “powers” while the Ninth Amendment is about “rights,” 
nevertheless winds up employing a strict construction of federal powers as a central feature of 
efforts to implement that Ninth Amendment.  During the debate over a bill of rights, one 
Federalist argued that the limited delegation of powers in article I “amounts in fact to a bill of 
rights.”86  If the linchpin of this argument was the assumption that implied rights limitations 
would be read into the powers, this would be a peculiar argument, inasmuch as the limited 
delegation of powers as such would add nothing to the security given the rights.  This would be 
even more puzzling when one considers how often the Federalists contended that their point was 
made by examining the text of the Constitution itself.  Thus James Wilson asked: “[W]hat part of 
                                                 
85See, e.g., MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 76-78  
(reviewing reliance on First Amendment to justify criminalizing seditious libel in the Sedition 
Act); id. at 231 (concluding that “the concern that gave rise to the Ninth Amendment was not 
some kind of farfetched claim is illustrated by the actual historical inference of national power” 
based on “the adoption of  a federal Bill of Rights”); AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 
supra note 13, at 124; Kurt T. Lash, “Tucker’s Rule”: St. George Tucker and the Limited 
Construction of Federal Power, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1376 (2006) [hereinafter cited as 
St. George Tucker] (Marshall used Federalist argument based on rights limitations in justifying 
the national bank in McCulloch); Forrest McDonald, The Bill of Rights: Unnecessary and 
Pernicious, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:   GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED 387, 398-400 (Ronald Hoffman 
& Peter J. Alberts eds., 1997) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED].   
 
862  RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 411, 412 (Thomas McKean, 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).   
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 this system puts it in the power of Congress to attack [the rights of conscience]?”87  Edmund 
Randolph inquired: “Where is the page where [freedom of the press] is restrained? . . . .  I again 
ask for the particular clause which gives liberty to destroy the freedom of the press.”88  The 
argument is that a simple examination of the text would convey what modern commentators 
insist is the consequence of an implied limitation based on inherent and natural rights.   
 On such a view, James Wilson could not logically have made the argument that if 
Congress had been granted the power “to regulate literary publications,” a liberty of the press 
provision would have been essential.89  If implied limitations would be read in to the powers 
granted, a power “to regulate literary publications” would be interpreted as permitting only 
regulations that did not abridge the preexisting right to a free press.  Wilson’s argument reflects 
that the parties to the debate over a bill of rights agreed that even inalienable natural rights 
(which freedom of the press was in most minds) were not automatically “retained” as to 
                                                 
872 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 455 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Dec. 
4, 1787).   
 
883 id. at 469 (Gov. Edmund Randolph, Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 15, 1788).   
 
892  RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, 168 (Oct. 6, 1787).  From Roger 
Sherman's convention argument that a provision for freedom of the press was “unnecessary” 
because “[t]he power of Congress does not extend to the Press,” 2  THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 618 (MAX FARRAND ED., 1911) [hereinafter cited as  
FARRAND], to Hamilton's argument in The Federalist No. 84 that inclusion of a provision 
guaranteeing a free press would imply a power to regulate the press that was not given, the 
Federalist argument was that the nature and scope of the actual grants of power were the 
protections afforded the people's rights by the proposed Constitution. See, e.g., Plain Truth: 
Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 20 at 219 (Nov. 10, 1787) (as Congress “can only have the defined powers given, it 
was needless to say anything about liberty of the press, liberty of conscience, or any other liberty 
that a freeman ought never to be deprived of”).   
 
 25 
  26 
                                                
governments of general legislative powers–or, as Wilson’s specific argument suggests, if the 
powers granted are sufficiently broad as to fairly be read as enabling government to threaten 
such a natural right.90  Wilson’s contention reflects that he took quite seriously the idea that the 
people’s authority was “absolute, supreme, and uncontrollable.”91  Contrast Wilson’s reliance on 
the people’s authority in establishing the Constitution with Professor Barnett’s characterization 
of the idea that the Constitution is based on the “consent of the governed” as nothing more than 
an elaborate fiction.92   
 
90Wilson is a somewhat perplexing figure, in that he was, at the same time, an advocate 
of “a fairly expansive conception of the scope of liberty protected by natural law,” MARK DAVID 
HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON 1742-1798, at 54 (1997), and 
yet displayed little “recognition of the problem of reconciling civil liberties with the principle of 
popular sovereignty.”  JAMES H. READ, POWER VERSUS LIBERTY: MADISON, HAMILTON, WILSON, 
AND JEFFERSON 113 (2000).  See McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 
1585-1587.  
 
91James Wilson, in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 348 
(Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787).   To Wilson it was clear that popular 
sovereignty “is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite 
in its extent.”  Id. at 349.   Accord, TUCKER, Of the Several Forms of Government, in VIEW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at  23 (people’s power is “unlimitable,” as well as “supreme, 
irresistible, absolute, uncontrollable,” and is “inherent” and “unalienable from them”).  Indeed, 
Wilson would have agreed that “the signature right of the Founding era–the right of self-
government–is best understood as a collective right rather than an individual right.”  Richard 
Primus, An Introduction to the Nature of American Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND (BARRY ALAN SHAIN ED. 2007) [hereinafter cited as THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS].    
 
92See, e.g,, RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 11-32  (2004) [hereinafter cited as RESTORING] (chapter entitled “The Fiction of ‘We 
the People’: Is the Constitution Binding on Us?”).  But see McAffee, The Court Over the 
Constitution, supra note 33, at 1565-1589; Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 813;  
Stephen M. Griffin, Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 287-
89 (2005).   Given his arguments against popular sovereignty, it is difficult to determine why – 
or even how -- Barnett endorses the popular right to “alter or abolish” the form of government a 
people live under.  See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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 Contrast Wilson’s clear statement with Professor Barnett’s insistence that Madison held 
the view that “Congress would have no power to infringe upon the rights of freedom of the press 
or of conscience whether or not these rights had been enumerated.”93  On this view, even a clear 
grant of power to regulate literary publications would not generate any need for a limiting 
provision inasmuch as the unstated right would already be “retained.”94  Madison’s actual 
argument is as follows: 
The defense against the charge founded on the want of a bill of rights pre-
supposed, he said, that the powers not given were retained; and that those given 
were not to be extended by remote implications.  On any other supposition, the 
power of Congress to abridge the freedom of the press, or the rights of 
conscience, &c., could not have been disproved.95 
 
Notice that at the center of the argument is our long-encountered proposition that “the powers 
not given were retained.”  Barnett, however, reads the injunction that the powers are “not to be 
 
93Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 781 (1997).   Cf.  
David N. Mayer,  The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor 
McAffee, 16 S.  Ill. U.L.J 313, 322-23 (1992) (acknowledging that Wilson and other federalists 
contended that in the states the people gave government every right and authority not explicitly 
reserved, and thus justified reliance on the enumerated powers scheme –  but still doubting that 
they “meant to contradict natural rights theory”). 
 
94Barnett’s view rests in part on the assumption that rights are “retained” whether they are 
positively “enumerated” or not.  One does not even require a Ninth Amendment for such rights–
enumerated or not–to be “retained.”  Indeed, a “prior” source of constitutional protection, we 
learn, is that an act of legislation is “improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it 
violates “the background rights retained by the people.”  BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 
186, citing Lawson & Granger, The Sweeping Clause, supra note 74, at 297.  Compare Lawson & 
Granger, The Sweeping Clause, supra note 74, at 318–19 (laws violating freedom of the press 
“improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause) with Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and 
Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 781 (1997) (construing Madison’s assurances that a free press 
is not threatened by powers granted, based partly on idea that powers should not be “extended by 
remote implications,” as based on a theory of “unenumerated rights”).  
 
952 Annals of the Congress of the United States 1901 (Feb. 2, 1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 
1834). 
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extended by remote implications” as “a restrictive interpretation of necessity” that reflects that 
strict construction of federal powers in effect was the means for avoiding an inadequate 
protection of unenumerated fundamental rights.   
 Wilson’s argument that the power “to regulate literary publications” would necessitate a 
free press clause need not, however, be read as contradicting Madison’s claim that “the powers 
not given were retained.”   Madison’s argument does not really appear to be one demanding 
strict construction;  it simply urges against such liberal construction that granted powers are 
“extended by remote implications.” As a participant in the debate in which the Constitution’s 
defenders contended that Congress’s few and defined powers would function as a veritable bill 
of rights, Madison was urging a careful construction of  granted powers, not one that invariably 
construed the Constitution–no matter what its words said–consistently with unenumerated 
“retained rights.”   
 And when James Iredell contended that an adequate “boundary” to prevent violation of 
rights has been provided and that “any person by inspecting [the Constitution] may see if the 
power claimed be enumerated,”96 the argument becomes quixotic if it really amounts to saying 
that implied limitations, not really conveyed by the text itself, actually supply the only 
“boundaries” to government power.  Thus Professor Hamburger could reasonably conclude that 
the Federalists believed that the precise “enumeration of federal powers provided a clear 
boundary between federal power and the people’s rights.”97  Looking back in 1820 at the 
 
964 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 171 (June 29, 1788).  
  
97Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. 
L.. REV. 239, 315-16 (1989).   
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ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights, and the subsequent adoption of the 
Ninth Amendment, John Taylor contended that the amendment enjoined “that the enumeration of 
certain rights shall not be construed to disparage those retained though not specified, by not 
having been parted with.”98 
 In presenting his draft of the Bill of Rights to Congress, Madison acknowledged that the 
granted powers included power “with respect to means, which may admit of abuse to a certain 
extent, in the same manner as the powers of the state governments under their constitutions may 
to an indefinite extent.”99  Congress’s power to collect revenues would enable it to enact a law 
permitting the issuing of general search warrants as a means of enforcing its revenue laws.100 
Madison’s premise was that Congress’s powers should  be understood  by a natural construction 
of the language conveying power, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause – with no 
 
98JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTIONS CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 49 (De 
Capo Press 1970) (1820) (emphasis added).  See id.  at 48.   (suggesting that “different modes are 
pursued,” in that both “certain specified aggressions are forbidden,” and “all the rights and 
powers not delegated are reserved”); TUCKER, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 121 (asserting that under Constitution each state 
was “retaining an entire liberty of exercising, as it thinks proper, all those parts of its 
sovereignty, which are not mentioned in the constitution, or act of union, as parts that ought to be 
exercised in common”).  See  Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 414. n. 409.   
 
99DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 82.   Madison directly compared the 
discretion to Congress granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause, with the discretion of state 
legislatures to enact “improper laws” in “fulfilling the more extended objects of those 
governments.” Id.   
 
100Id. at 82-83.   Madison’s frank acknowledgment is quite consistent with the conclusion 
of a modern commentator that “[a]n examination of the arguments for and against the need for a 
bill of rights shows the Antifederalists to have the stronger argument.” Murray Dry, The 
Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISM: THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 25, 
38 (Josephine F. Pacheco ed., 1992) [hereinafter cited as ANTIFEDERALISM].  But notice how 
contrary this conclusion is to the view that the nation could have proceeded based on natural 
rights that were nowhere enumerated.  See infra note 139 and accompanying text.   
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presumption against government power imported in – and this necessitated the insertion of the 
Fourth Amendment.101   
 Despite his genuine concerns about the potential impact of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Madison continued to believe that the enumerated powers scheme would be a powerful 
means to secure important rights.  This view was demonstrated reflected in his response to 
criticisms that emerged when Congress adopted the language of “retained” rights rather than 
adopting the language proposed by Virginia  prohibiting an inference of enlarged powers from 
prohibitions on the exercise of powers in the Constitution.102  Edmund Randolph had objected to 
the reference to “retained rights,” contending that it purported to protect  rights, but the rights 
were “reducable [sic] to no definitive certainty.”103  He thus advocated that this “reservation 
 
101At one time, Professor Barnett fully acknowledged that Madison’s argument reflected 
a recognition that the Necessary and Proper Clause showed the need for a bill of rights.  Barnett, 
Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 14.  Despite insisting that the Ninth Amendment secured natural 
liberty rights, and having freely acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment presented an example 
of a “positive right,” Barnett eventually changed his mind and concluded that both the Ninth 
Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause precluded the use of general search warrants.  
MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37,  at 62 n. 150; McAffee, The 
Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1549-50.    
 
102The original Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed an amendment that forbad 
construing rights limitations “to extend the powers of Congress.”  DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 
supra note 24, at 21.  For the full text, see supra note 51.  Madison’s proposal read as follows:   
 
    The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of particular 
rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the 
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations 
of such powers, or as inserted merely for the greater caution. 
 
1 Annals of Cong., supra note 21, at col. 452.  
 
103Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 1188.  
Burnley was a member of the Virginia assembly.   Professor Barnett takes Burnley and Madison 
as seeking a single end, of securing personal rights, and thus concludes that any concerns about 
  31 
                                                                                                                                                            
against constructive power” should conform to the pattern established by the first and 
seventeenth amendments proposed by Virginia.”104  Madison, agreeing completely with 
Assemblyman Burnley, thought the distinction between not “extending” powers and retaining 
rights was “fanciful,” because if you can draw a line “between the powers granted and the rights 
retained,” it doesn’t matter whether you state the amendment in terms of  rights or powers.105 
 
“power” were folded in to the Tenth Amendment.  See Randy E. Barnett, James Madison’s Ninth 
Amendment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 1, 13  (Randy E. Barnett ed. 1989) (“The 
danger of interpreting federal powers too expansively was handled by the Tenth Amendment, 
while the danger of jeopardizing unenumerated rights was addressed by the Ninth 
Amendment.”).  If this were so, the question raised is how he manages to interpret the Ninth 
Amendment as both securing rights and as justifying “a narrow construction of the powers of the 
national government.” Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously, supra note 1, at 509.         
 
104Id.  In his letter to Madison, Burnley stated that he did not see “the force of the 
distinction, for by preventing an extension of power . . . safety will be insured if its [Congress’s] 
powers are not too extensive already.”  Id.    “Thus Burnley was confident that the people’s 
rights would be adequately protected by the proposed amendment, provided the Convention had 
adequately defined federal powers in the first place.”  MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS 
RESERVED, supra note 37, at 37.   For a review of this correspondence, concluding that it lends 
strong support to a “federalism” interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, Inescapable 
Federalism, supra note 54, at 836-44; id. at 838 n. 130 (noting that Professor Barnett rejects 
Madison’s distinction “as out of sync with modern understanding of personal rights,” but 
concluding that Madison “had a different point of view”).   But see Barnett, The Ninth 
Amendment, supra note 32, at 55 (contending that “Burnley himself clearly distinguishes 
between ‘the people’ and ‘the states’ and the actual words of the Ninth Amendment refer only to 
the former”).   Barnett’s characterization of Burnley’s words confirms that he simply does not 
understand Burnley’s argument.  For additional confirming evidence, see Barnett, Reconceiving, 
supra note 68, at 16.   
 
105Id. at 1189, 1190 (letter from Madison to President Washington, Dec. 5, 1789).    
Notice that both defenses of the final wording required the use of a hypothetical assumption that  
federal powers had been adequately defined so that the rights were “adequately protected” and 
one could draw the line between granted powers and protected rights.   For a more complete 
analysis of the correspondence regarding the debate in the Virginia assembly, see McAffee, 
Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1287-1293.  See also Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra 
note 54, at  836-44; id. 839-40 (concluding that both Burnley and Madison “believed that 
Randolph had wrongly criticized the Ninth Amendment as inadequately ‘federalist,” and that 
“the retained rights of the people would necessarily constrain federal power and adequately 
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 Madison believed that, if the framers had drafted the grants of powers as carefully as they 
should have – and that he thought they had – drawing a distinction between the final version of 
the amendment and the one that Virginia had initially proposed, made no sense at all (or was 
“fanciful,” as he put it).  Madison confirmed absolutely the views expressed by Hardin Burnley, 
who could not see “the force of the distinction,” for the same reason–namely, if its framers had 
succeeded in ensuring that Congress’s powers were “not too extensive already,” by the drafting 
of a set of meaningfully limited powers, prohibiting an inference of enlarged powers would mean 
exactly the same thing as preserving the people’s “retained” rights.  Professor Lash observes that 
Madison was in effect confirming the close connection between the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments: 
Although the final version of the Ninth Amendment spoke only of the retained 
rights of the people, Madison insisted that preserving retained rights and 
constraining federal power amounted to the same thing and that the final version 
continued to express the same federalist principle demanded by the state 
conventions.  This is how Madison described the Ninth Amendment in a major 
speech while the Amendment was under consideration, and this is how every 
scholar and court read the Ninth Amendment for the next one-hundred years.106 
 
 It has become common to assert that the fundamental, unenumerated  rights construction 
of the Ninth Amendment receives strong support from the amendment’s reference to rights, not 
powers, that are “retained” by the people.  For example, it has been contended that “under social 
 
protect the retained rights of the people and the states”).  Even though it is true that neither of the 
state proposals, nor the final version of the Ninth Amendment, were designed to supply “an 
explicit protection of the rights of states,” Barnett The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 54 
(emphasis added), each was designed to protect what had been “retained” by the sovereign 
people – state by state -- when granting powers to the nation.   
 
106Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 808.  Lash also observes that, 
although the other states were fully aware that Madison’s original proposal “expressly limited 
federal power,” no other state objected to the language change.  Id. at 843.  
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contract theory,” this phrase refers to “natural rights ‘retained’ during the transition from the 
state of nature to civil society.”107  The very fact that the amendment refers to retained rights is 
taken as referencing liberty rights that the people “retain” when they leave the state of nature and 
join the social contract.   
 Thus Professor Barnett emphasizes two considerations: first, Madison used the word 
“retain” in referring to natural rights the people keep “when particular powers are given up to be 
exercised by the Legislature.”108 Secondly, Roger Sherman used the word “retained” when 
proposing a rough equivalent of Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights to the committee charged 
with fashioning a completed version of the amendments proposed for the Constitution.109   
But the words “retained” and “reserved” were used pervasively in the ratification-era debate over 
the omission of a Bill of Rights, and generally referred to what the sovereign people – referring 
to either “the people” considered as a collective whole or to “the people” making the ratification 
 
107 Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1075 (1991) [hereinafter cited as Flag Burning Amendment].   
 
108BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 54, citing, 1 The Debates and Proceedings in 
the Congress of the United States 454 (Gales & Seaton eds., 1834).  For a different analysis of 
the drafting process and its relationship to the Ninth Amendment, see McAffee, Social Contract 
Theory, supra note 74, at 296-305. 
 
109BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 238, 243.  For a different perspective on 
Sherman’s role in bringing us the Bill of Rights, including treatment of Sherman’s proposed  
language anticipating both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see McAffee, The Court Over the 
Constitution, supra note 33, at 1556-1561. Accord, Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, 
at 29 n. 102 (noting that although Barnett at one time “appeared to claim that Sherman’s Draft 
Bill of Rights” was linked to “retained individual natural rights,” it now appears that he has 
“backed away from that claim”); Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 362-367.   That 
Madison proposed similar language to be inserted in the Constitution’s preamble, see note 64 
and accompanying text, simply confirms that Sherman’s proposed natural rights provision likely 
reflected that sections 1 and 3 of the Virginia bill of rights remained significant in the minds of 
the founders.   
  34 
                                                
decision state by state – “kept” when they “granted” or “delegated” powers to the national 
government.110  T he pattern was reflected in the language of Article II of the Articles of 
Confederation, which stated that each State  would “retain” “every power,  jurisdiction, and 
right,” not “delegated to the Congress.”111  It is thus unsurprising that James Wilson went so far 
as to assert that “the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people.”112  And 
when Madison summarized the ratification debate when presenting his proposed amendments to 
Congress, he observed that the Federalists had viewed the Constitution as “a bill of powers, the 
great residuum being the rights of the people; and, therefore, a bill of rights cannot be so 
necessary as if the residuum was thrown into the hands of the Government.”113 
 The lack of significant weight legitimately given to the particular language chosen for the 
Ninth Amendment is illustrated by Patrick Henry’s use of the very phrase, “the rights retained by 
the people,” in describing the contents of the Virginia bill of  rights in the Virginia Ratifying 
Convention.114  It is absolutely clear that Henry did not perceive natural rights as automatically 
 
110The classic example of this usage is in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 84, where 
he contended that “[h]ere, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every 
thing, they have no need of particular reservations.”  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 84, supra note 63, at 578 (emphasis added).  He goes on to favorably compare the preamble 
as a “recognition of popular rights” to the “aphorisms” that made up state Declarations of Rights.  
Id. at 578-79.  See infra note 150.   
 
111DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 19.   
 
1122 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 469, 470 (Dec. 4, 1787).  
 
113James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His 
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at  51, 59.   
 
1143 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 448.   
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“retained” because they were natural rights or were “inalienable.”115   That Henry was, instead, a 
constitutional positivist is reflected not only in his insistence on the absolute necessity of a bill of 
rights, but also in his role in opposing the inclusion of a Bill of Attainder Clause in the Virginia 
Bill of Rights and in his promotion, as governor, of the adoption of a bill of attainder during the 
American revolution.116  
 Though Justice Chase directly contradicts the substance and  tenor of the ratification-era 
debate over the omission of a Bill of Rights, Professor Barnett takes his invocation of 
“unenumerated rights” in Calder v. Bull117 as stating the precise “original public meaning” of the 
federal Ninth Amendment.  He takes Justice Iredell as contending before the North Carolina 
Ratifying Convention not only that there are “unenumerated rights,” but that “all rights should 
remain unenumerated.”118  After all, Barnett asserts, the Constitution’s framers “shared a 
common belief that although the people may delegate certain powers to their agents in 
government, they still retain their natural rights.”119  Indeed, Professor Barnett assures us that 
 
115See infra notes 140-141 and accompanying texts.  
 
116McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra note 74, at 279-80, 294.   
 
1173 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).  
 
118Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 4, 4  
(2006) [hereinafter cited as Who’s Afraid].  But it is quite clear that Iredell believed that the 
“unenumerated rights” consisted of the rights defined by what had not been “granted” to the 
federal government as powers.   A close reading of Iredell’s speeches as the North Carolina 
Ratifying convention confirms that this is true.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text; and 
infra notes 191-199 and accompanying texts.   
 
119Randy E. Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Today’s Constitution, 26 VALP. U. L. REV. 
419, 422 (1991).   By contrast, in the modern era, Professor Pound has contended that “[n]atural 
rights mean simply interests which we think ought to be secured . . . [and] it is fatal to all sound 
thinking to treat them as legal conceptions.” Roscoe Pound, The Rights of Englishmen and Rights 
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until the federal Bill of Rights was adopted “two years after the ratification of the Constitution,” 
with a handful of “exceptions,” it was clear that “all of the rights retained by the people were 
unenumerated.”120  And yet, he offers reassuringly, “no one argued that the federal government 
had the power to abridge or deny . . . unenumerated liberties.”121  
 But we have seen that virtually no one engaged in the controversy over  the omission of a 
bill of rights during the ratification-era debates thought the natural rights were simply “retained,” 
as a matter of law, under the state constitutions that existed prior to the ratification of the United 
States Constitution.   Since the state constitutions conveyed “a general grant of legislative 
authority,” it followed that “no rights were immune from such broad state powers and some 
explicit reservation would be necessary.”122  Even the  rights sometimes referred to as “inherent” 
or “inalienable” – especially if not written down as specific limiting provisions – did not 
necessarily function as limits on the general powers of the states’ legislatures; this is why the 
state constitutions  were universally regarded as  requiring  Declarations of Rights within their 
state constitutions if the powers of government were going to be limited in any fashion.123     
 
of Man, in THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, at 85, 92 (1921).   
 
120Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
429, 435 (2004) [hereinafter cited as The Police Power].  See also  BARNETT, RESTORING, supra 
note 92, at 235-36. 
 
121Id.  By contrast, Professor Barnett contends that the modern tendency to advocate more 
restrictive readings of the Ninth Amendment reflects a “modern philosophical skepticism about 
rights.”  Barnett, Reconceiving, supra note 68, at 3.     
 
122Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 430, 431 (2000) (reviewing 
INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION,  AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY:   THE FOUNDERS’ 
UNDERSTANDING (see infra note 124)).   
 
123See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying texts.   See infra notes 137-162; 171-184 and 
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  III. 
 Natural Rights and Constitutional Positivism 
 
 It is common for advocates of the fundamental, unenumerated rights construction of the 
Ninth Amendment to write as if we are confronting a very strong dichotomy between 
“naturalists,” or advocates of natural rights jurisprudence, and “positivists,” those who advocate 
constitutional positivism.124  Those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, and especially 
those who accepted and ratified the Bill of Rights, were naturalists.125    By contrast, modern 
thinkers who contend for alternative interpretations of the Ninth Amendment, are often moral 
skeptics who are also positivists.126  The prospect that there could be a “moral realist defense of 
constitutional democracy,”127 that reads the Constitution itself as a basically positivist document, 
 
accompanying texts. 
 
124THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS’ UNDERSTANDING 16 -17 (2000) [hereinafter cited as INHERENT 
RIGHTS] (concluding that this  presumed dichotomy “obscures the reality that even a legal system 
purportedly grounded on natural law norms must confront challenging institutional questions 
about implementing those norms in political and legal practice”).   
 
125For a citation to several sources attributing a natural law jurisprudence – and certainly 
not a positivist one – to the founding generation, see Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a 
Meaningful Debate of the “Unwritten Constitution” Thesis, 61 U. CINC. L. REV. 107, 133 n. 83 
(1992) [hereinafter Prolegomena].  
 
126BARNETT,   RESTORING, supra note 92, at 242-252 (subsection entitled “The Views of 
Ninth Amendment Skeptics”); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMM. 93, 96  (1995) [hereinafter cited as Getting 
Normative] (contending that “skeptics” have provided “labored textual and historical arguments” 
against the unenumerated fundamental rights reading of Ninth Amendment); id. at 111 (if those 
who would comply with text are right that the text “does not provide any protection of 
unenumerated rights, they may have won the constitutional battle, yet lost the legitimacy war”).   
 
127Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89 (1988). 
 
 is dismissed out of hand.  The assumption is that the Constitution’s framers were just enough 
naturalists that, even the text we call the Ninth Amendment, was in an important sense, 
superfluous, given that the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers already believed that the people had 
“retained” the rights they held by nature at the time they joined the social contract we call the 
Constitution.     
 Those who begin with this sort of assumption find it difficult to believe that “the Framers 
in 1787 were committed to protecting fundamental freedoms, but did not believe enumeration was 
the best constitutional strategy for securing cherished individual rights.”128 As Professor Graber 
noted,    
The persons responsible for the original Constitution thought they had secured 
fundamental rights by a combination of representation, the separation of powers, 
and the extended republic.  The Bill of Rights, in their view, was a minor 
supplement to the strategies previously employed for preventing abusive 
government practices.129         
 
Similarly, Richard S. Kay observed that the framers of the federal Constitution perceived 
“unwritten fundamental rights” as “profoundly important,” but “they agreed that the critical issue 
on which their protection turned was the character of the new national government.”130 Professor 
                                                 
128Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights:   
The View From 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 362 (2007) 
 
129Id. at 360.  For general support for the view that the framers were initially relying on 
alternatives to the enumeration of rights, see MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124;  
McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1509-1511, 1565-1593; Thomas B. 
McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 
43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 98-104 (1998) [hereinafter cited as Federal System]; Thomas B McAffee, 
Substance Above All:  The Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitutionalists, 4 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 516-521 (1996) [hereinafter cited as Utopian Vision].  
 
130Kay, supra note 122, at 432.   
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 Kay concluded there would have been “little point” in the debate over inclusion of a bill of rights 
had unenumerated natural rights “been understood as directly enforceable by the courts.”131  
 It has thus become a standard objection to any restrained reading of the Ninth Amendment 
that it is part of “the historical tendency to misunderstand the meaning of the amendment” and 
reflects “the shift of our legal culture from a jurisprudence of natural law to one of legal 
positivism.”132  But the alleged dichotomy between a constitutional jurisprudence based on natural 
law and rights, and one based on legal positivism, does not really address, let alone resolve, the 
fundamental questions presented about how to interpret the Ninth Amendment.  Almost ten years 
ago, I wrote: 
Three of the thinkers who most influenced the framers of the Constitution, John 
Locke, Edward Coke, and William Blackstone, do not supply us with definitive 
answers to the questions we would ask.  Locke was committed to republican 
government and legislative supremacy that went hand in hand with his commitment 
to limited government and natural rights enforceable by the people’s inherent right 
of revolution.  Coke described as void any Act of Parliament that is “against 
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed.”  Yet 
Coke’s famous utterance “seems to have enjoyed only a brief usefulness in pre-
Revolutionary polemics,” for citations to Coke ceased after Blackstone construed 
the statement as a mere rule of construction.   Blackstone was committed to the 
common law and natural law, but he also believed in Parliamentary sovereignty 
(and the related idea of legislative supremacy).133 
                                                 
131Id.   
 
132McAffee, Prolegomena, supra note 112, at 113 n. 16  For a recent example of work that 
appears to embrace the notion of a presumed dichotomy between natural rights jurisprudence and 
constitutional positivism, see Barnett, Who’s Afraid, supra note 118, at 4.  
 
133McAffee, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 3-4  (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case, 8 Coke 
Rep. 107, 118a (1610); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 92-93 (1971); Thomas C. Grey, The Original 
Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in SIX ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145, 152  
(Neil L. York ed. 1988) [hereinafter cited as The Original Understanding].) Compare McAffee, 
The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1509-11. 
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 This pattern, reflected in these intellectual origins of American constitutional thought, is 
equally embodied in the works of the most significant founders – those who developed the 
thinking that produced the Ninth Amendment during the debate over the ratification of the 
Constitution.   It was over thirty years ago that Robert Cover observed that “[t]he most telling 
aspect of the American variant of constitutional positivism was the enthusiasm for written 
constitutions–the almost compulsive mania for rendering the allocation of power explicit.”134  
Years before Cover wrote, Professor Corwin stated the view that “legislative sovereignty” lost out 
in America because “in the American written constitution, higher law at last attained a form which 
made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute  
emanating from the sovereign people.”135  As Gerald Stourzh has contended, in America the 
functioning eighteenth-century British constitution came to recognize “certain imperatives or 
prohibitions as fundamental elements of the laws of the land without thereby creating a special 
category of legal norms.”136 
 
 
                                                 
134ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 27 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ACCUSED].     
 
135EDWARD S. CORWIN, The “Higher Law” Backgroun of American Constitutional Law, in 
CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUITON 138-39 ( R. LOSS ED. 1981). 
 
136Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Law and Individual Rights in the 18th Centuury 
Constitution, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING–ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION  
336 (J. BARLOW, LEONARD LEVY, & K. MASUGI, EDS., 1988).    See generally MCAFFEE, INHERENT 
RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 65-66 (subsection entitled “The Centrality of the Written Constitution).  
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 A.   The Antifederalists.  
 Those who opposed ratification of the Constitution in part because of the omission of a bill 
of rights – known in history as the Antifederalists – were adamant that a bill of rights was 
absolutely essential.137  Their arguments insisting on “the necessity of an express stipulation for all 
such rights as are intended to be exempted from the civil authority”138 demonstrate that they were 
simultaneously strong advocates of securing natural rights even as they were also strong 
constitutional positivists.139   They repeatedly denied that a written Constitution includes even a 
presumption of any sort in favor of fundamental rights, insisting that it is “universally 
acknowledged” that the natural rights “can neither be retained to themselves, nor transmitted to 
their posterity, unless they are expressly reserved.”140  Before the Virginia ratifying convention,  
Patrick Henry summed up his argument that a bill of rights was “indispensably necessary” by 
                                                 
137Professor Rakove observed that “[t]he logic of the Antifederalist position was deeply 
positivist.” Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra 
note 91, at 181, 193.  See id. at 193-94 (stating that the Antifederalist arguments “presupposed that 
the existence and security of rights depended on their explicit  inclusion in the constitutional text”).   
 
138Essays by the Impartial Examiner (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 177 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1988) [hereinafter cited as THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST].   
 
139The Impartial Examiner contended that each community member must “be presumed to 
give up all those powers into the hands of the state by submitting his whole conduct to the 
direction thereof.” Michael Lienisch, Reinterpreting Rights: Antifederalists and the Bill of Rights, 
in GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 245, 266, quoting, 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 177.  See supra note 100.   
 
140Essays by the Impartial Examiner (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at  176.  Accord, Patrick Henry, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, 
at 445 (June 14, 1788) (“all nations” have adopted the construction that rights not expressly 
reserved are impliedly relinquished); Letters from Agrippa (Jan. 14, 1788), reprinted in 1 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 51, at 515 (people “of course” delegated “all rights not expressly 
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 insisting “that a general positive provision should be inserted in the new system, securing to the 
states and the people every right which was not conceded to the general government.”141  In the 
well-known Letters of Agrippa, the author concluded that “a constitution does not in itself imply 
any more than a declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government have to 
each other, but does not imply security to the rights of individuals.”142  Perhaps the most 
thoughtful Antifederalist commentator, the author of Letters from a Federal Farmer, summed up 
social contract theory, including the assertion that the people cannot “deprive themselves” of 
inalienable natural rights, even as he claimed that they still might “resign” the rights “to those who 
govern.”143   
                                                                                                                                                                
reserved”).   
1413 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 445 (June 14, 1788).   See McAffee, Original 
Meaning, supra note 43, at 1244.   Accord, id. (quoting Henry asserting that “[i]f you intend to 
reserve your inalienable rights, you must have the most express stipulation; for, if implication be 
allowed, you are ousted of those rights”); Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 828  
(citing Henry’s speech insisting on the need for an “express stipulation”; also observing that Henry 
“merges the language of individual rights with that of state autonomy” ).   
 
1424 THE COMPETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 59,  at 108 (Jan. 9, 1788).   Following up 
on the logic of legislatures with general legislative powers, the same author argued that since “the  
whole power resides in the whole body of the nation,” the consequence is that “when a people 
appoint certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power” unless they reserve 
power in the Constitution.  Id. at 109.  He concluded “that a constitution is not itself a bill of 
rights.’” Id.  Similarly, the author of Essays by a Farmer posed the rhetorical question: “If a citizen 
of Maryland can have no benefit of his own bill of rights in the federal courts, and there is no bill 
of rights of the United States–how could he take advantage of a natural right founded in reason, 
could he plead it and produce Locke, Sydney, or Montesquieu as authority?”  5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 13 (Feb. 15, 1788).  The obvious assumption is that the great 
political philosophers who so influenced the revolutionary generation are not legal authorities; 
natural rights are not ipso facto constitutional rights, or rights within the civil law.  They must be 
secured in positive law.     
 
143Letters from a Federal Farmer, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 
231.  See also The Impartial Examiner, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 
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  A powerful illustration of Antifederalist thought is presented by George Mason, who 
authored the Virginia bill of rights.144  Mason was unquestionably one who was deeply committed 
to principles of natural law and natural rights.145  Indeed, a number of modern commentators assert 
that Mason’s famous statement that there are “certain inherent rights” of which the people “cannot, 
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity,”146 was simply “declaratory of limitations which, 
                                                                                                                                                                
175-179   (one who enters society gives up “to government his power to act freely unless he 
reserves particular powers,” meaning that it is essential to have “an express stipulation for all such 
rights as are intended to be exempted from the civil authority”); David Caldwell, in 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 24, at 9 (North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 24, 1788) (arguing that 
Constitutions should embody “maxims” deemed fundamental to “every safe and free government,” 
and describing one such maxim as the statement that “[u]nalienable rights ought not to be given 
up, if not necessary”).  For additional documentation that “inalienable” referred to a moral claim, 
not a legal one, see McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1533, 1556-1561.   
 
144Va. Const., Bill of Rts (1776), reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64, at 
3813.  Kukla strenuously asserts that “Mason believed with all his heart in the urgency of a 
declaration of rights.”  Jon Kukla, “Yes! No! And If . . . Federalists, Antifederalists, and Virginia’s 
“Federalists Who are for Amendments,” in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 43, 59. 
 
145Indeed, Mason argued against a 1682 act of the Virginia assembly, which had purported 
to sell certain Indian women into slavery, that it was “void of itself, because contrary to natural 
right.”  Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772), cited in Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background 
of American Constitutional Law, in 1 Corwin on the Constitution 79, 199 ( R. Loss ed., 1981).   
 
146Va. Const., Bill of Rts  § 1, in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64  at 3813.   Section 
1 reads: 
 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain 
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by 
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity: namely, the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety.  
 
Id.   
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 because they are inherent, exist as legal limitations whether declared in writing or not.”147    
 In fact, even though Section 1 of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the Inherent Rights Clause, is 
the provision from which Professor Barnett insists the Ninth Amendment was drafted,148 its 
original author was a prominent Antifederalist who opposed ratification of the Constitution, in 
significant part because it omitted a bill of rights.149  But if it was universally, or even widely, 
believed that natural rights supply legally enforceable limits on government because they’re 
inherent, it would have been clear that a bill of rights was simply unnecessary.  So Mason’s 
objection to the omission of a bill of rights suggests that “inherent” did not mean “legally 
                                                 
147Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights 
“Retained” by the People, 16 S.I.U. L.J. 267, 281 (1992) [hereinafter Social Contract Theory].  It 
was Mason’s “Inherent Rights Clause” that accounts for the title of the book I published: 
MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124.  For standard treatments making these claims, see 
Grey, The Original Understanding, supra note 133, at 156;  Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ 
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1132-33 (1987) [hereinafter cited as Unwritten 
Constitution].  Professor Barnett, in turn, concluded that the Ninth Amendment – drawn from 
Roger Sherman’s proposed amendment, which was based on Mason’s Inherent Rights Clause –  
was designed to secure each citizen his or her natural “liberty,” and indeed to create a 
“presumption of liberty.”   BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 235 (“[T]he phrase, ‘others 
retained by the people,’” was “a reference to the natural or liberty rights that are retained by the 
people when forming a government,” and it mandates that “they are not to be ‘denied or 
disparaged’”).  For a different understanding of the relevance of the Inherent Rights Clause, see 
infra notes 148-158 and accompanying texts.   
 
148See BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 246-47 & n. 85 (contending that the 
language of Ninth Amendment has a  “common ancestry” with natural rights proposals that had 
been offered by Virginia and North Carolina.).   
 
149Indeed, Dean Reinstein observed, in honoring the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights, that 
it was George Mason who seconded a motion to add a bill of rights to the proposed federal 
Constitution.  Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, 
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 364 (1993) [hereinafter cited as 
Completing the Constitution].  The motion was, of course, “rejected decisively.”  Id.   
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 enforceable” to Mason.150  But his objections went further still.  He objected to the omission of 
Article II of the Articles of Confederation, contending that without such a provision “many 
valuable and important rights” would be considered to be “given up.”151  Mason also stated what 
became the standard Antifederalist argument that “the Laws of the general Government being 
paramount to the Laws and Constitutions of the several states, the Declarations of Rights in the 
separate states are no security.”152   
 Almost twenty years ago, I wrote:   
 
If natural rights were viewed as creating inherent and enforceable legal limits on the 
scope of granted powers, Mason and others should logically have viewed the 
                                                 
150It has been observed that  
 
when the state constitutions made reference to “inherent” or “inalienable” natural 
rights, these statements of principle were taken to be just that.  They were taken as 
widely accepted statements of political principle, but not as enforceable limits to 
government power.  This is what enabled Alexander Hamilton to argue that 
expressly stating the doctrine of popular sovereignty, and thereby acknowledging 
the authority of the people to amend their constitutional system to better meet their 
needs and to secure their rights, “is a better recognition of popular rights than 
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state 
bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise on ethics than in a 
constitution of government.” 
 
McAffee, The Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1505 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 
84, at 579 (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).)   
 
151George Mason, 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 444 (June 14, 1788).  
 
15213 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 348 (Oct. 7, 1787).  Indeed, 
“[a] typical argument was that the Supremacy Clause implied ‘that the constitutions and laws of 
every state are nullified and declared void, so far as they are or shall be inconsistent with this 
constitution.’” McAffee, Prolegomena, supra note 57, at 138 n. 99 (citing 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 362, 365 (Essays of Brutus Oct. 18, 1787).)  Some went even 
further, arguing that the Supremacy Clause was added “to prevent the possibility of doubt that the 
consequence would be consolidated government that ruled by an “iron-handed despotism.”  Letter 
of Centinel V (Nov. 30, 1787), in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 138, at 168. 
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 supremacy clause as subject to these implied limitations, particularly since the 
supremacy clause grants the status of supreme law only to laws enacted pursuant to 
the Constitution.  Implicit in Mason’s argument is the assumption that natural rights 
had become binding constitutional norms by virtue of their inclusion within the 
state constitutions; since those constitutions were inferior to the federal constitution, 
it followed that the natural rights would be forfeited to the extent that federal 
powers were construed broadly enough to reach them.153 
  
 Mason may well have learned a thing or two from the experience of presenting his draft of 
the inherent rights proposal to the convention that inserted it into the Virginia constitution.  
Because the Inherent Rights Clause that became section one of the Virginia bill of rights initially 
embodied the “natural equality principle,”154 it created a fear that the provision would make 
slavery unconstitutional.  The result was that the provision was amended.  “With the critical 
change italicized, the amended provision stated that all men are ‘by nature free and independent, 
and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity.’”155   The amendment clarified “that the fundamental 
rights that people retain as they enter civil society did not apply to the Black race because the 
                                                 
153McAffee, Social Contract Theory, supra note 147, at 281.  Responsive Federalists took 
Mason’s argument as a straightforward positivist argument about the constitutional text’s meaning.  
E.g., Letter from Roger Sherman to Unknown (Dec. 8, 1787), in 14 RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 386-87 (contending that Supremacy Clause applied only to laws 
not exceeding powers granted by the Constitution and that the states would police system to ensure 
that federal government did not overstep its boundaries); id. at 389 (to have “a well regulated 
government, the legislature should be dependent on the people, and be vested with a plenitude of 
power . . . to be exercised only for the public good”).   
 
154The clause states “[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent . . . .”   Va. 
Const., Bill of Rts § 1 (1776), reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 64, at  3813.  
 
155MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 18 (quoting id).   
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 slaves had never entered into a state of civil society in Virginia.”156   There could hardly be a more 
starkly positivist move than this amendment; it seems quite clear that if all are “by nature” free and 
independent, those rights would remain valid moral claims quite apart from whether someone 
thought you had, or had not, left the state of nature and entered “into society.”157   
 In view of Mason’s experience with the Inherent Rights Clause, it is entirely unsurprising 
that when Mason drafted a proposed bill of rights in 1788 – for the Virginia Ratifying Convention 
– the two changes from the Virginia Bill of Rights were: (1) the omission of the Inherent Rights 
Clause, which included the “natural equality” principle; and (2) the conditioning of a number of 
specific enumerated rights to “freemen” only. 158  Professor Reinstein concluded:   
                                                 
156Id.  See also Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 370-72;  Warren 
M. Billings, “That All Men are Born Equally Free and Independent”: Virginians and the Origins 
of the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 335, 339-40 (Patrick J. Conley & 
John P. Kaminski, eds. 1992).    
 
157The language change, however, enabled Edmund Randolph to contend that “the slaves 
not being constituent members of our society could never pretend to any benefits from such a 
maxim.”  Barry A. Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the Declaration of Independence, in THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 116, 118.  Virginia’s section 1 itself appears to have rested 
to a degree on a basic ambiguity, between “natural” rights and customary (or common law) rights, 
that was exploited by revolutionary Americans; thus many contended, “No man will deny that 
provincial Americans have an inherent, unalienable Right to all the Privileges of British subjects.”  
Id.  at 129.  Accord, id. at 136 (noting that James Duane preferred “grounding our Rights on the 
Laws and Constitution of the Country from when we sprung,” and contended that the “Privileges 
of Englishmen were inherent” and “an inheritance,” meaning that we could not be “deprived of 
them”);  MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 62  n. 150 (noting 
that arguments against writs of assistance were based on view that “acts against the fundamental 
principles of the British constitution are void,” even while claiming that “[t]his doctrine is 
agreeable to the laws of nature”).   
 
158For the specific content of Mason’s proposed bill of rights – substituting “freeman” for 
persons or people, etc. – presented at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, see Reinstein, Completing 
the Constitution, supra note 149, at app. B, arts. 9, 10, 12, 14, 15.  Mason’s reference was not 
altogether unique.  In his Inaugural Address, President Washington – likely with Madison’s help as 
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 Mason’s revisions, taken together, would have done more than insure a bill of rights 
in the United States Constitution would not threaten slavery.  By explicitly 
conditioning rights to “freemen” only, Mason’s revisions would have legitimated 
the institution of slavery.  This proposal would have incorporated the Declaration’s 
inalienable rights, but for white people only. 159  
 
 At an equally fundamental level, Virginia’s “inherent rights” provision itself has generally 
not been viewed, or treated by courts, as generating a legally enforceable limitation on government 
power.160   Professor G. Alan Tarr observed that the inherent rights clause – like many provisions 
in the state declarations of rights – was “addressed not to the state judiciary primarily but to the 
people’s representatives, who were to be guided by them in legislating, and even more to the 
liberty-loving and vigilant citizenry that was to oversee the exercise of government power.” 161   
                                                                                                                                                                
a ghost writer – suggested that the parameters of the new bill of rights were “a reverence for the 
characteristic rights of freemen, and a regard for public harmony. . . .”  2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 176 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1987), cited in Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra 
note 149, at 374.     
 
159Id. at 372.  Even when efforts to invoke the “natural equality” principle in courts failed, 
it remained clear that constitutional drafters continued to equate such declarations with freedom.  
Hence slave state constitutions either completely omitted the “free and equal clause” from their 
documents, or added a “peculiar transformation” of language in the attempt to “make it consistent 
with the peculiar institution of slavery.”  Id. at 377-78.   
 
160See Thomas B. McAffee, The “Foundations” of Anti-Foundationalism – Or, Taking the 
Ninth Amendment Lightly:   A Comment on Daniel A. Farber’s Book on the Ninth Amendment,   
___ NEV. L.J. [9-10] (2008) [hereinafter Foundations]  (reviewing Farber’s RETAINED BY THE 
PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T 
KNOW THEY HAVE (2007)).   
 
161G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 78 (1998).  Accord, Rakove, 
The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 181, 190 (bills of 
rights in early constitutions were “conceived as statements of principle meant to guide the behavior 
of officials and citizens alike,” not as “actual restraints”).  See also MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, 
POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 12-13; Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth Klein-Levine, & 
Thomas B. McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions Revisited: Unwritten Constitutionalism in the 
States, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 333, 360-69 [hereinafter Courts Over Constitutions].   
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 Modern Americans often have no grasp of how founding-era Americans viewed the claims in their 
declarations of rights: 
The declarations’ individual rights provisions were framed in terms of ‘ought’ or 
‘ought not’ rather than ‘shall’ or ‘shall not,’ or occasionally as statements of 
political ideals.  These formulations were clearly not inadvertent. . . .   This wording 
very probably reflects in part the idea of restating the fundamental principles, which 
inherently bind government, as opposed to promulgating new sovereign commands.  
In a sense, this language conveys their greater importance; but in another sense, it 
also reflects the recognition of the drafters that such principles are to be honored 
rather than enforced.  The language of the declarations conveys the idea that the 
enumerated liberties were “serious principles by which government was to abide,” 
but were nevertheless subject in general to qualification as essential for the public 
good.162 
  
 It is thus almost certainly no coincidence that the ratifying convention proposals to include 
“inherent rights clauses” in the proposed amendments to be added to the new Constitution 
prompted Madison to propose language, clearly based on Virginia’s inherent rights provision, to be 
inserted in a proposed “prefix” to the Constitution.163   A crucial aspect of the development was 
that Madison, apparently encouraged by a letter from Thomas Jefferson, “substituted words of 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
162MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 24 (quoting Robert C. Palmer, Liberties 
as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791, in CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 65, 75 (1987).)     
 
163This development is described at supra note 64 and accompanying text.  Compare 
MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, supra note 37, at 16 (noting that drafters of 
state declarations of rights did not “regard rights as enforceable against the legislature or 
executive,” frequently using “the term ‘ought’ instead of the mandatory ‘shall in their 
declarations”); id. at 30-31 (linking state plenary power conception to debate over omission of a 
bill of rights).   
 
Madison did not go to the extremes that Mason did; He used “person” or “people” instead 
of “freeman” in the enumeration of rights, and he also omitted the “free and equal clause,” 
substituting words that did not refer to natural rights.  Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, 
supra note 149, at 372.   
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 command and prohibition for the hortatory language that had dominated the Declarations of 
Rights.”164  His proposed amendment to be added to the preamble, as a prefix to the Constitution, 
read as follows:   
That there be prefixed to the constitution a declaration, that all power is originally 
vested in, and consequently derived from the people.  
 
 That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of 
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of 
acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety.   
 
 That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to 
the purposes of its institution.165     
 
 Just as Madison had reworded the amendments proposed by the state ratifying conventions 
to try to ensure that they could be legally enforceable, it is noteworthy that he retained the 
language of principle, not command, in the proposed amendment to be included in the 
Constitution’s preamble.  Madison summarized the inherent rights language without referring to 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
164McAffee, Foundations, supra note 160, at 10.  See McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra 
note 37, at 769-71. 
 
165James Madison, Speech to the House Explaining His Proposed Amendments and His 
Notes for the Amendment Speech, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 54.   
 
Cf. Va. Const. Of 1776, Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 3, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 64, at 3812, 3813 (asserting that “all men are by nature equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any 
compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety;” 
and that government is “instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people . . 
. ; and that, when any government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a 
majority of the community hath an . . . inalienable . . . right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such 
manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal”).   
 50 
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the relevant interests with that term.166   He also followed the lead of the New York state ratifying 
convention, which had proposed an amendment that referred to the same specified rights as 
“essential rights which every Government ought to respect and preserve.”167  Madison’s steps may 
well have reflected an attempt to move “in the direction of supporting government,” as he begins 
with society as a starting point and refers to government being for the “benefit of the people,” 
rather than referring to “inherent rights of which man cannot be divested.”168  A more sinister 
evaluation is that “[t]he Founders deliberately omitted the Declaration [of Independence’s] 
 
 
166Dean Reinstein observed that:   
 
Even without the declaration that all people are by nature free 
and equal, a constitutional provision asserting the existence of 
‘certain natural rights’ might be applied against slavery, because 
both English and American courts had held that this institution 
violates all natural rights.  So Madison omitted the clause on natural 
rights as well.  Instead, he borrowed language from the Declaration 
of Independence and the Virginia Declaration of Rights but used it in 
a way that deprived those declarations of any force.    
 
Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 373. 
 
167See Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, July 26, 1788, in 
DOCUMENTARY RECORD, supra note 24, at 21 (“That the enjoyment of Life, Liberty, and the 
pursuit of Happiness are essential rights which every Government ought to respect”) (emphasis 
added in text). 
 
168Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in HOW DOES THE 
CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 15, 53 n.50 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds. 
1985).   In any event, it not only is now well established that preambles are not operative 
provisions that are legally enforceable, but Edmund Randolph, writing his opinion as Attorney 
General on the constitutionality of the national bank, suggested that the preamble is at most 
“declarative only of the views of the convention,” indicating what “they supposed to be best 
fulfilled by the powers delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of preambles.”  Walter 
Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The Attorney General’s 
First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 126 (1994)   
 doctrine of equal rights from the Bill of Rights, not because that doctrine was considered mere 
rhetoric, but because its inclusion in the Constitution would have been dangerous to the continuous 
existence of slavery.”169  Whatever the explanation, it appears that Madison drafted the language “in 
the ‘softer’ format that had characterized state declarations, despite the marked trend in another 
direction” because “he was seeking to avoid legally undermining slavery even while paying 
appropriate lip service to basic principle.”170  
B.   The Federalists  
 A thorough analysis of the ratification-era debates strongly confirms that its participants were 
in general agreement that the basic questions they needed to address related to how best to interpret 
the positive law of the Constitution.171  Under the state constitutions that were the forerunners of the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
169Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 362-63.   Surely 
Madison would have been aware that many in the South opposed a bill of rights for the reason 
offered by Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as part of the South Carolina ratification debate.  Pinckney 
argued that “[s]uch bills generally begin with declaring that all men are by nature born free,” an 
assertion that would be made “with a very bad grace, when a large part of our property consists of 
men who are actually born slaves.”  Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation, Reconstruction, and 
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS , supra note 91, at 163, 171 (citing 
JONATHAN ELLIOT, FOUR DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 316 (1836)).         
 
170Thomas B. McAffee, Did the Federal Constitution “Incorporate” the Declaration of 
Independence?, 1 NEV. LJ. 138, 153-155 (2001).  Pauline Maier observed that Madison and others 
possibly perceived that the Declaration’s principles “might impede the foundation of a stable, 
effective national government.”  PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 195 (1998).  But it may be that “Madison feared alienating the 
support of slaveholders,” and thus he acquiesced in the rejection of his “pared-down version of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights.”  Id.  See also Pauline Maier, The Strange History of “All Men Are 
Created Equal,” 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 881 (1999) (contending that “Madison’s ‘prefix’ was 
probably designed in part to calm antifederalists without provoking slave holders,” but observing 
that “Congress instead eliminated the ‘prefix’ altogether”).   
 
171In an important book on the ratification-era debate on the proposed Constitution, the 
 52 
 Constitution being debated, it was rather clear that “the people” had not “retained” any 
constitutionally protected (and hence legally enforceable) rights automatically.172  Indeed those who 
drafted the state constitutions, we learn from Professor Lutz, “assumed that government had all 
power except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill of rights.”173  Theophilus Parsons, who 
                                                                                                                                                                   
editors summed up the Federalist position: 
 
Federalists rejected the proposition that a bill of rights was needed.  They 
made a clear distinction between the state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.  
Using the language of social compact, Federalists asserted that when people formed 
their state constitutions, they delegated to the states all rights and power which were  
not explicitly reserved to the people.  The state governments had authority to regulate 
even personal and private matters.  But in the U.S. Constitution, the people or the 
states retained all rights and powers that were not positively granted to the federal 
government.  In short, everything not given was reserved.  The U.S. government had 
strictly delegated powers, limited to the general interests of the nation. 
 
Therefore, Federalists argued, a bill of rights was not only unnecessary, but 
might even be dangerous.  Unnecessary, because the new federal government could 
no way endanger freedom of the press or religion, for instance, since it was given no 
constitutional power to regulate either.  Dangerous, because a listing of rights could 
be interpreted as inclusive.  Rights omitted might be considered as not retained.  And 
the listing of rights, such as freedom of the press, might imply that a power to 
regulate the press existed absent the provision.   
 
THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS–THE DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 151-52 (JOHN P. KAMINSKI & RICHARD LEFFLER EDS., 1998). 
 
172This bit of common ground is what explains the Federalist reliance on the enumerated 
powers scheme as an alternative to a bill of rights, rather than the general idea that there are natural 
or inherent rights; it is also the reason most thoughtful commentators have thought the 
Antifederalists had the better of the argument.  See supra notes 100, 139.  
 
173DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY 
IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 60 (1980).   Lutz’s characterization of the intentions of those 
who drafted the state constitutions and declarations of rights is strongly confirmed by Wilson’s 
defense of the omission of a bill of rights based on the Constitution’s grant of limited and defined 
powers.  See supra note 39.  It is critical to distinguish, however, between the framers’ description of 
the legal effect of granting or retaining specific powers and the same framers’ conceptions of the 
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 became a Federalist proponent of the Constitution contended, in opposition to a proposed 
Massachusetts constitution in 1778, that the people’s rights “ought to be settled and established, 
previous to the ratification of any constitution for the State.”174 
 Nathaniel Gorham explained that “a bill of rights in state governments was intended to retain 
certain power [in the people] as the legislatures had unlimited powers.”175  The Federalist 
proponents of the Constitution “referred to the ‘rights of the people’ as ‘powers reserved,’ or as 
reserved rights and powers.”176  Since a Bill of Rights was “an enumeration of the powers reserved,” 
                                                                                                                                                                   
natural rights to which they were entitled.   On one hand, Edmund Randolph referred to “those 
paramount rights, which a free people cannot be supposed to confide even to their representatives,” 
even though the legislature is “instituted” by a written constitution under which it is “presumed to be 
at large as to all authority which is communicable by the people.”  Dellinger & Powell, supra note 
156, at 122-23 (editing and reprinting Randolph’s opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed 
national bank).   Despite this qualification even of “general” legislative powers, Randolph still 
suggests that “[e]ssentially otherwise is the condition of a legislature whose powers are described,” 
because then “it claims no powers which are not delegated to it.”  Id. at 123.  Randolph would not 
reject  Lutz’s conclusion that the framers of the state constitutions intended legally that state 
legislatures held all power “except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill of rights;” rights could 
be “inalienable” or “paramount,” morally, but became legal limits on government power only by 
being placed in a bill of rights.  This is the only reason that Randolph could argue that the “best 
security” of rights was “the express enumeration of powers,” even as he acknowledged the need for 
a bill of rights in state constitutions.  3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 467 (Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, June 15, 1788).   See supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
 
174Quoted in, CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: THE ORIGIN OF THE 
AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 422 (1953). The Reverand Jonas Clark similarly 
contended that “it is of the highest importance . . . that said rights intended to be retained, at least 
those that are fundamental to the well-being of society and the liberty and safety of individuals, 
should be in the most explicit terms declared.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 
1751 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 335 (Sept. 27, 1787).    
 
176See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1247.   James Wilson went so far as to 
assert that “the powers given and reserved form the whole rights of the people.”  2 RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 469, 470 (Dec. 4, 1787).  Cf. 3 FARRAND supra note 81,  at 
255, 256 (C.C. Pinckney) (delegation of powers reserves “every power and right not mentioned”).  
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 it followed that “[i]f we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be 
given.”177  The Federalists were thus concerned that a bill of rights “would at least imply that 
nothing more was left with the people than the rights defined and secured in such bill of rights.”178  
Despite the limitations found in article I, sections 9 and 10,  it remained quite clear, even long after 
adoption of the federal Constitution, that states constitutionally could pass a bill of attainder or an e
post facto law if the text of the constitution of the State did not prohibit the state from so using its 
law-making power.
x 
e’s Declaration of Rights.”180   
                                                                                                                                                                  
179  The “right” to be free of legislative trials and laws criminalizing an act 
retroactively were “retained,” under the state constitutions, only when such a right was “stated as a 
limitation to the plenary power held by state legislatures in the stat
 
These figures believed that what was “reserved” when the federal government was granted limited 
powers would constitute an adequate group of rights.  This is why Professor Bowling refers to the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments as “the reservation amendments.”  Kenneth B. Bowling, 
Overshadowed by States’ Rights:   Ratification of the Federal Bill of Rights, in GOVERNMENT 
PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 95.     
 
177James Wilson, 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 387, 388 
(Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787).  The Federalists were anxious, then, that an 
“enumeration of rights must not suggest a government of unenumerated power.”  Lash, Lost 
Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358.   
 
178Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 3 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 20, at 569 (emphasis added).  Thus Wilson could 
contend that “a bill of rights would have been improperly annexed to the federal plan” inasmuch as 
“it would imply that whatever is not expressed was given, which is not the principle of the proposed 
Constitution.”  James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 
2  RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION , supra note 20 at 391 (emphasis added).  
 
179McAffee,  Liberty Over Law, supra note 33, at 1546-47 (observing that Justice Joseph 
Story stated quite clearly that a “every state, unless prohibited by its own constitution, might pass a 
bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, as a general result of its sovereign legislative power”).   
 
180Id. at 1547 n. 246.   
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  Dean  Reinstein underscored that the Constitution’s Federalist defenders contended that bills 
of rights had been “necessary to limit the powers of otherwise omnipotent monarchs.”181  By 
contrast, since the proposed Constitution recognized the people’s sovereignty, and “the government 
had only those powers delegated to it,” the “people’s rights should be secured by the structure of the 
new government and not by an enumeration of rights.”182  The Federalists were also intensely aware 
that the state declarations of rights were generally drafted in hortatory language, suggesting that 
those who drafted them were not contemplating legal enforcement, a phenomenon that led many of 
them to conclude that “[a] bill of rights was also useless because it would be unenforceable,” and 
government “would not be stopped by any ‘paper guarantee.’”183 
 Despite their strikingly different views about the nature of the proposed Constitution, both 
the Federalists and Antifederalists completely agreed that only laws that violated express 
prohibitions were unconstitutional under the state constitutions that preceded the federal 
Constitution.  This is amply documented:  
It was a standard view that the state governments, ‘unlike governments of delegated 
and enumerated powers, had (as representatives of the sovereign people) all powers 
not constitutionally forbidden them. The consistent understanding was that as a 
government of ‘plenary’ power, ‘a state constitution does not grant governmental 
power but merely structures and limits it.’  To its Framers, precisely because the 
proposed federal Constitution gave power to the national government only when it 
was explicitly conferred, it raised an inference in favor of liberty.184 
                                                 
181Reinstein, Completing the Constitution, supra note 149, at 366. 
 
182Id.   
 
183Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295-300 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds. 1977).)     
 
184Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 339  
(citing Forrest McDonald, The Bill of Rights: Unnecessary and Pernicious, in GOVERNMENT 
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It was precisely because the “rights” were understood by reference to the powers that had been 
delegated to the nation that both parties to the bill of rights dispute could refer interchangeably to 
rights “retained” by the people and rights “reserved” to the states.    So Patrick Henry could insist 
that it “was expressly declared in our Confederation that every right was retained by the states, 
respectively, which was not given up to the government of the United States.”185   
 By contrast, several modern commentators, including in particular Professor Barnett, contend 
that the Ninth Amendment embodies the social contract moral and political theory of America’s 
Lockean founders, including a guarantee of natural liberty  rights that were “retained” by the people.  
But even advocates of this reading of the Ninth Amendment often acknowledge that “early in our 
legal history judges made a decided turn away from natural rights as a basis of limiting legislative 
power and towards a positivist approach that enforced whatever laws did not violate express 
prohibitions.”186  According to Professor Barnett, this “positivist” approach did not manifest itself 
                                                                                                                                                                   
PROSCRIBED, supra note 85, at 387, 388, and TARR, supra note 81, at 7;  G. ALAN TARR & MARY 
CORNELIA PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 50 (1988).). See also  McAffee, 
Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 749-51.  Even Professor Massey, a longtime advocate of 
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, acknowledged that the state constitutions rested 
on a presumption that state governments possess “all powers except those explicitly denied” to them. 
CALVIN MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION’S 
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 87 (1995).     
 
185Patrick Henry, Debates in the Convention of the State of Virginia (June 14, 1788), in 3 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 445-46.   
 
186Randy E. Barnett, Who’s Afraid, supra note 118, at 5.  In fact, as we have seen the project 
of the first Congress was to consolidate rights.   
 
As nervous as all centrists about the instability of rights arguments, they 
pruned the open-ended, natural-rights abstractions out of the document with the rigor 
of men determined to lock up that line of argument against the future and the external 
 57 
 until the well-known Chase/Iredell debate in Calder v. Bull,187 a decision that illustrated a 
developing reluctance of courts “to explicitly protect unenumerated rights.”188   Justice Chase, of 
course, was emphatic that “the nature and terms of the social compact” are “the foundation of the 
legislative power,” and will invalidate laws even though “its authority should not be expressly 
restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State.”189  As Professor Grey observed, 
however, Justice Chase also acknowledged that the state legislatures “retain all the powers of 
legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions; which are not expressly taken away by the 
constitution of the United States.”190  Indeed, Professor Grey states that despite acknowledging 
conventional understandings, Justice Chase apparently concluded that “this plenary legislative power 
                                                                                                                                                                   
democratic clamor.  Many of them hoped to make the language of rights routine and 
merely legalistic. 
 
Daniel T. Rogers, Rights Consciousness in American History, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS , supra 
note 91, at 258, 264.    
 
1873 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).   
 
188Barnett, supra note 20, at 3.  Barnett’s useful discussion of the Chase/Iredell debate is 
found at id. at 3-6.  Similarly, Professor Grey asserts that “Iredell gave what seems to be the first 
explicit statement of full-fledged constitutional positivism; the doctrine of judicial review can 
enforce written but not unwritten constitutional principles.”  Grey, The Original Understanding, 
supra note 133, at145, 149.  For a critical reaction, see MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS 
RESERVED, supra note 37, at  50 n. 12.   James Wilson and Federalist defenders of the Constitution 
clearly interpreted the state constitutions as granting plenary powers to their legislatures, while 
enumerated powers almost reversed this presumption in favor of government power.  See supra note 
39 and accompanying text.    
 
189Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1798) (emphasis subtracted).  
 
190Id. at 399.  See Grey, The Original Understanding supra note 133, at 148.  
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 was not so plenary after all.”191   
 In discussing Iredell’s contribution to the debate in Calder,  Barnett concludes that what is 
“both interesting and disturbing is how it contrasts with his colorful affirmation of unenumerated 
rights before the North Carolina ratification convention ten years earlier.”192  It is certainly true that 
Iredell had referred to unnamed rights when debating the ratification of the Constitution in North 
Carolina.  Specifically he had said: 
[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights which 
are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest 
manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by the 
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate every one. 
Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will 
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.193  
 
Iredell had asserted in North Carolina, says Barnett, “that impairing such unenumerated rights would 
be a usurpation.”194  Moreover, Barnett argues, “nowhere in this speech does he suggest  
                                                 
191Grey, The Original Understanding, supra note 133, at 148.  It is critical to realize that 
unwritten constitutionalism necessitates viewing legislatures as not holding “plenary” powers; but, 
as Calder illustrates, this is a view that contradicts the assumptions of both the Federalist and 
Antifederalist participants in the ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights.   
 
192Barnett, The Ninth Amendment,  supra note 32, at 4 (citing 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra 
note 24, at 167).   
 
1934 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 167 (July 28, 1788) (emphasis added).  See also id. 
at 149 (arguing that a bill of rights “would not only be incongruous, but dangerous,” because it woud 
be construed as showing “that the people did not think every power retained which was not given,” 
with the implication that a bill of rights “might operate as a snare rather than a protection”).  Iredell 
was not so much articulating the need for an “unenumerated” rights clause as he was trying to 
indicate the advantages of the limited powers scheme as a device for securing valid moral claims 
(rights) as contrasted to a legislature of general powers being subjected only to the limits stated in a 
bill of rights.  See infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 
194For analysis and interpretation of Iredell’s comments, see Barnett, The Police Power, 
supra note 120, at 445-46 (asserting that only Iredell’s assurance of the range and scope of 
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 that only enumerated limitations on legislative power would be enforceable, as he later did in 
Calder.”195  
 The evidence, however, reveals that Iredell held a consistent view over the entire ten year 
period.  Iredell’s presentation in North Carolina was delivered in the midst of a debate about how 
best to secure inalienable natural rights.  The Antifederalist, Samuel Spencer, had objected that 
“[t]here is no declaration of rights, to secure to every member of the society those unalienable rights 
which ought not to be given up to any government.”196  In response, Iredell assured that the natural 
rights would be secure if there is “such a definition of authority as would leave no doubt197” so that 
“any person by inspecting the Constitution may see if the power claimed be enumerated.”198  It is in 
                                                                                                                                                                   
unenumerated rights can explain how he “eventually adopted so short a list as those contained in the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights”).   Barnett’s interpretation tracks with Suzanna Sherry’s, and 
both read Iredell’s reference to “rights which are not intended to be given up” to be referring to 
inalienable natural rights.  See Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 142, at 1164-66.  But there 
are good reasons to think that Iredell was referring to rights not “given up” by virtue of the limited 
grant of federal power, especially given that he so clearly stated that the rights are presumptively 
“given up” to a legislature with general powers.  Given Iredell’s endorsement of the necessity of a 
Bill of Rights under the state constitutions (see infra note 200 and accompanying text), his concern 
appears to have been that shifting to a bill containing specific limitations might mean that the 
Constitution would establish a national legislature of general powers (like the states), thereby 
effectively eliminating the rights reserved by the limited powers scheme.  
 
195Id.  Though Iredell clearly perceived unenumerated natural rights, it is just as clear that he 
did not perceive them as legally binding as to a government with general legislative powers.  See 
infra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 
1964 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 137 (North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 28, 
1788).   Notice that Spencer characterizes the claim that a right is “unalienable” as fundamentally a 
moral claim – that which “ought not be given up to any government.”     
 
197Id. at 171 (July 29, 1788).   
 
198Id. at 172 (emphasis added).  Iredell responds to the claim that the rights required the 
protection of a “fence” to mark them off, which Iredell describes as the insistence that “there ought 
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 this context that Iredell explains that his fear of a negative inference as to omitted rights rested on a  
concern that a later generation might deduce from a bill of rights that “the people did not think every 
power retained which was not given.”199 
 At the same ratifying convention in 1788, Iredell was extremely clear that, as to a 
government with general legislative powers, a law conflicting with an unstated right would not be 
seen as “impairing” the unenumerated right, or as a usurpation, and that “only enumerated 
limitations on legislative power would be enforceable.”   
If we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would 
not only have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an 
exception to the legislative authority in such particulars. It has this effect in respect to 
some of the American constitutions, where the powers of legislation are general. But 
where they are powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of 
the [federal] Constitution before us, I think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of 
rights is not only unnecessary, but would be absurd and dangerous.200  
 
 Iredell’s argument follows the Federalist pattern of formulating the feared “danger” as a 
reversal of the assumptions that justified the argument against the necessity of a bill of rights.  For 
example, at one point Madison observed that the Constitution provides that “every thing not granted 
is reserved,” but then contended that “[i]f an enumeration be made of our rights” it will be “implied 
that every thing omitted is given to the general government.”201 For example, at one point Madison 
                                                                                                                                                                   
to  protection of a “fence provided against future encroachments of power.”  Id. at 171.   
199Id. at 149. 
 
2004 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 149.   Iredell clearly fully accepted the Federalist 
position that the distinction between governments of general versus enumerated legislative powers 
explained the need, or lack of need, for a bill of rights.  This is a theme that has been carefully 
documented for almost twenty years.  See McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1267-1268.   
 
2013 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 620 (June 24, 1788).  See supra note 50 and 
accompanying text.   
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 observed that the Constitution provides that “every thing not granted is reserved,” but then 
contended that “[i]f an enumeration be made of our rights” it will be “implied that every thing 
omitted is given to the general government.”202  This is why it is misleading to rely starkly on 
Madison’s contention that a bill of rights would be dangerous “‘because an enumeration which is not 
complete is not safe.’”203 If one correctly gathers that Madison was confident, on the one hand, that 
in the Constitution as drafted “every thing not granted is reserved,” one quickly realizes that it is 
only  adding a bill of rights to the enumerated powers scheme that could imply “that everything 
omitted is given to the general government.”204   
 Thus, Madison further clarified his point by asserting that “[s]uch an enumeration could not 
be made, within any compass of time, as would be equal to a general negation, such as his honorable 
friend (Mr. Wythe) had proposed.”205 George Wythe, a Federalist proponent of the Constitution, had 
submitted to the Virginia Ratifying Convention a “resolution of ratification” that had stated “that 
every power, not granted [by the Constitution], remains with [the people], and at their will; that, 
therefore, no right, of any denomination, can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified, by the 
Congress . . . except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution for those 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
2023 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 620 (June 24, 1788).  
 
203Sherry, Unwritten Constitution, supra note 142, at 1163 (quoting Madison, 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 24, at 626 (Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 24, 1788)).   Sherry takes 
Madison as referring to the potential loss of “unenumerated” rights–thinking of additional, but 
unmentioned limits, on granted powers in favor of rights.   
 
204See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 
205 James Madison, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 24, at 
626-27. 
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 purposes.”206 In short, before the Virginia Ratifying Convention Madison linked the problem of an 
inevitably imperfect enumeration of rights with the Federalist assumption that a vast range of rights, 
too numerous to list, are secured by the enumerated powers scheme and threatened by the insertion 
of a bill of rights.207  
 V.   
 The Ninth Amendment and Post-Adoption Evidence 
 
 One of the challenges facing those who seek the original meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment is precisely that the history of the amendment relates both to rights and powers and is 
easily tied to early disputes about national power under our federal system.   While the early 
post-Griswold debate over the meaning of Ninth Amendment focused almost exclusively on the 
ratification-era dispute over the omission of a bill of rights that led to the proposed amendments of 
the state ratifying conventions, in recent years scholars have increasingly looked at evidence 
generated by subsequent efforts to explicate the scope of federal powers under the Constitution.   
The Federalists always contended that the limits on federal power implicit in our federal system, and 
most especially its system of limited and enumerated powers, would do a great deal to secure a 
number of the rights that might otherwise be included in a bill of rights.208   Beyond the argument 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
206George Wythe, Virginia Ratifying Convention, in id. at 656. 
 
207The Federalists – neither James Madison, George Wythe nor the rest – were not 
“contending that these rights and all others were best protected by leaving them unenumerated,” 
Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 28, except to the degree that the enumerated 
powers scheme secured them.   
 
208The Federalists never contended that the enumerated powers scheme would secure each 
and every right that might be included in a bill of rights.  The notion that they contended against the 
necessity of a bill of rights based on a “rights-powers conception” of individual rights – where rights 
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 that a bill was not really necessary, Federalists also feared that a bill of rights might be viewed as 
essential and even present the danger of reversing the presumption to one in favor of power, so that 
the only security provided for rights would be – as in the state constitutions – the specific limitations 
found in the bill of rights.       
 Specifically, the inclusion of rights in a bill of rights could be construed as in effect implying 
powers not intended to be given.209   A separate concern – articulated most frequently by 
Antifederalist opponents of ratification – was that the omission of Article II of the Articles of 
Confederation, reserving unenumerated “rights, powers, and jurisdiction,” to the states, could be 
read to mean that the federal government would hold general legislative powers.210    From this 
perspective, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are “explanatory amendments,” both being intended 
to control “the expansion of federal power and reserving all nondelegated power and rights to the 
states.“211  As Professor Lash has noted, “listing certain rights could imply that the only limits to the 
                                                                                                                                                                   
are defined invariably and entirely by reference to powers, thus never “trumping” powers – receives 
no support from the ratification-era debate over the omission of a bill of rights.  See McAffee, The 
Court Over the Constitution, supra note 33, at 1532-1535 (critiquing Professor Barnett’s attempt to 
defend such a proposition).  The Federalists merely believed that a number of the most fundamental 
rights, about which Antifederalists were concerned, were adequately secured by the grant of limited 
and defined powers – indeed, as “the residuum” of those powers.   
 
209See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 55, at 579. 
 
210See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying texts.   
 
211Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358.  The term “explanatory amendment” 
is Madison’s.  2 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1901 (JOSEPH GALES ED., 1834) (Feb. 2, 1791) (James 
Madison) (referring to the “explanatory declarations and amendments accompanying the ratifications 
of the several States”).  See also Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 358-59, 392.  Lash 
correctly takes the Ninth Amendment as clarifying that “[t]he enumeration of rights must not suggest 
a government of unenumerated power.”  Id. at 358. 
 
 64 
 interpreted scope of federal power were those particular limits listed in the Constitution.”212   
 But of course from the early days of the republic Americans have disagreed about the 
interpretation of federal powers, as well as the scope of the grant of power contained in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.   Now it is true that the “explanatory amendments” we call the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments explicitly merely re-state the propositions that the government is one of 
delegated and reserved powers – propositions that were thought by many to secure and protect  
rights and interests of both states and individuals.  They do not purport to tell us – at least not clearly 
and explicitly – how national powers are to be construed.213  Even so, both amendments have come 
to figure in the debate over how to interpret the powers granted the national government, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and each has been used at various times, by courts or commentators 
(and sometimes both) to warrant a restrained construction of either the powers themselves or the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.   
 When Madison presented his proposed amendments to Congress, he noted that many were 
anxious for a provision stating that “the powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the 
several States.”214  Admitting that such a provision may be “deemed unnecessary,” he concluded 
                                                 
212Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45,  at 361.   
 
213It is still true that the Virginia Ratifying Convention proposal, from which the Ninth 
Amendment was drafted, did specifically prohibit an inference of extended powers from the 
inclusion of limits on powers elsewhere in the Constitution (or Bill of Rights).  Even so, it was  
Madison who was emphatic that “preserving retained rights and constraining federal power 
amounted to the same thing and that the final version [of the Ninth Amendment] continued to 
express the same federalist principle demanded by the state conventions.”  Lash, Inescapable 
Federalism, supra note 54, at 808.  See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.    
 
2141 Annals of the Congress of the United States 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1791) (1834). 
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 that “there can be no harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is
stated.”
 as 
                                                
215  So “Madison stated his belief that the proposed Tenth Amendment probably was not 
necessary, but that expressly declaring the principle was considered important to the state 
conventions.”216  As we have noted, it is no coincidence that similar language generally reserving all 
not granted was proposed by every state ratifying convention that proposed amendments.217 
A.   Madison’s Opposition to Hamilton’s National Bank 
 Madison and other Federalists had argued against a bill of rights on grounds that a sufficient 
security for rights grew from the fact the “every thing not granted is reserved,” and, further, that the 
implication of general legislative powers might be drawn from a bill of rights.218  This is precisely 
why Madison could contend, as he did, that there was no real distinction between Virginia’s 
Seventeenth proposed amendment and the Ninth Amendment’s final language that referred to 
 
215Id.   The view Madison expressed in Congress is the view commonly accepted as the 
modern reading by which the Tenth Amendment is viewed as “[d]eclaratory of overall constitutional 
scheme” and “had no independent force as originally understood.”  CHARLES LOFGREN, The Origins 
of the Tenth Amendment: History, Sovereignty, and the Problem of Constitutional Intention, in 
GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE:   CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM 113 (1986). See MCAFFEE, BYBEE, & BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED, 
supra note 37, at 40.   
 
216Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 360.   
 
217See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  In addition, Antifederalists would lobby hard 
“to change the wording of what would eventually become the Tenth Amendment–to restrict the 
powers of the new government to those expressly delegated by the Constitution.”  SAUL CORNELL, 
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, 
at 244 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as THE OTHER FOUNDERS]; Dry, The 
Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 39 (listing five state 
conventions that proposed limiting Congress’s powers to those “expressly” or “clearly” delegated).   
 
218See supra note 200 and accompanying text.   
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 retained rights.219  Federalists believed that the limited grant of federal power was adequate to secure 
freedom of the press and freedom of religion, but also perceived the danger that the specific 
provision for such freedoms could generate an inference of a power to regulate such topics.  They 
were thus anxious to make clear “what the Federalists claimed were principles already implicit in the 
structure of the Constitution.”220    
 At the same time, the omission of a Bill of Rights could only be defended if Congress’s 
powers were not interpreted to “give an unlimited discretion to Congress.”221   In opposing 
Hamilton’s bill that would create a national bank,  Madison concluded that Hamilton had articulated 
the doctrine of implied powers so as to “reach every object of legislation, every object within the 
whole compass of political economy.”222  According to Madison, “an implication of the critical 
premise that these are limited grants of power is that there is a barrier to the exercise of a ‘great and 
                                                 
219See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.   
 
220Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 391-92.   A related point is that “the 
Founders generally viewed rights and powers as two sides of the same coin.”  Id. at 400.  Hence 
“limiting powers and securing rights amount to the same thing: the extension of one results in the 
disparagement of the other.”  Id.   See also McAffee, Original Meaning, supra note 43, at 1226, 
1291.   
 
221James Madison, Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791, at 371 (William Charles 
DiGiacomantonio et al., eds, 1995) [hereinafter cited as Documentary History]. Madison’s speech 
opposing the bank bill is discussed in id. at 388-91.  The solution to the problem was clear enough; it 
“simply required that the Constitution be interpreted as if the Antifederal amendments had been 
passed: strict construction.”  Dry, The Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISTS, 
supra note 100, at 41.   
 
222Madison, 14 Documentary History, supra note  221, at 372.   
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 important power, which is not evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.’”223 More 
than ten years ago, I summarized Madison’s analysis of this issue: 
Madison relies on a number of critical factors, including the legislative nature of the 
proposed bank’s power to make by-laws, the power granted to purchase and hold real 
property, the support the bank would receive from penal regulations and, finally, the 
particular point that the bank was effectively granted a monopoly in derogation of the 
“equal rights of every citizen.”  Madison’s net conclusion is that these factors, when 
taken together, show that “the power of incorporation exercised in the bill” may not 
“be deemed an accessory or subaltern power, to be deduced by implication, as a 
means of executing another power.”224 
 
 In the context of this argument for a somewhat restrained reading of enumerated powers, 
Madison relied upon both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.225   They were the “explanatory 
amendments,” both of which excluded from proper interpretation “the latitude now contended.”226  
The Ninth Amendment guarded against “a latitude of interpretation,” and the Tenth excluded “every 
source of power not within the constitution itself.”227  Professor Lash sums up the conclusions 
                                                 
223McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 126, quoting James Madison, 2 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 1899 (1791).   
  
224Id. at 127, quoting James Madison, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1900 (1791).   
 
225Madison’s focus on the Ninth Amendment may have reflected in part that he had rather 
clearly suggested to Congress that the Tenth Amendment may well be redundant and unnecessary.  
See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.  As we will see, however, in the battle over the 
Alien and Sedition Act Madison would rely on the Tenth Amendment as having “independent force” 
in justifying relatively strict construction of federal power.  It should not be surprising, then, that the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments came to be perceived to both embody and reflect governing 
assumptions about the nature of our federal system.    
 
226James Madison, WRITINGS 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1989) [hereinafter cited as 
WRITINGS].   
 
227Id.   Hamilton’s defense of the bank did not rely on the limiting provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to justify an expansive reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, so it is quite unclear that 
either Virginia’s seventeenth proposed amendment or the final text of the Ninth Amendment can be 
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 Madison reaches in his speech against the bank in this fashion: 
The federal government is one of limited enumerated power. All nondelegated 
powers are reserved to the states.  Unduly broad interpretations of these enumerated 
powers would destroy this principle by allowing the government to invade areas of 
law reserved to the states.  Important powers like those exercised by the Bank Bill are 
not appropriately derived by implication but require enumeration.228 
 
 Some have contended that Madison’s reliance on the Ninth Amendment reflected that he 
perceived the bank as invading an individual right “retained” by the people.229  Specifically, it is 
argued that this is what Madison was referring to in describing the bank as a monopoly that “affects 
the equal rights of every citizen.”230  In truth, Madison never stated or implied that “the monopoly 
status of the bank would be a sufficient basis by itself to warrant constitutional objection.”231  It is, 
                                                                                                                                                                   
read as literally applying to the bank problem.  Madison’s analysis reflects, however, that the 
Federalists came to perceive themselves as seeking to prevent interpretation with the effect of 
“levelling all the barriers which limit the powers of the general government, and protect those of the 
state governments.” Madison, 14 Documentary History, supra note 221, at 375. 
 
228Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 393.  Professor Lash concluded:  “In his 
Bank speech, Madison presented the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction that preserves the 
principle enshrined in the Tenth.”  Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1360.  
 
229Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 745, 784-85 (1997); David 
N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S. 
Ill. L.J. 313, 318-19 (1992).   
 
230Randy E. Barnett, Foreward: Unenumerated Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 615, 637 (1991). 
 
231McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 128.  See Lance Banning, Federalism, 
Constitutionalism, and Republican Liberty: The First Constructions of the Constitution, in Liberty 
and American Experience in the Eighteenth Century 388, 404 (David Womersley ed. 2006) 
(summing up Madison’s arguments against the bank bill with his statement that it would destroy “the 
essential characteristic of a government . . . composed of limited and enumerated powers”).  Others 
who used the Ninth Amendment to oppose the bank, even when the debate concerned renewing its 
charter, were clear that their argument was based on federal power and states’ rights, not personal 
claims.   See Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 863-65.   
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 moreover, especially unlikely that Madison would have been relying on a fundamental right against 
economic monopolies, in view of his history of opposition to including an antimonopoly 
constitutional prohibition in the bill of rights.232  Professor Lash’s conclusions therefore seem 
undeniable: 
Madison . . . was not arguing that the bank charter violated individual rights.  In fact, 
Madison expressly stated that the proposed bank charter would “directly interfere 
with the rights of the States.”  Madison’s reference to the effect of a monopoly on the 
equal rights of citizens was in support of his argument that the power to charter a 
bank was an important power and, thus, required enumeration.233 
 
 Considering that Madison’s argument was based on a conception of federalism, it is 
significant that, despite the full-blown debate within the Washington administration as well as in 
Congress, the bill was enacted and signed into law by President Washington.234  Madison himself 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
232McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 116-17.  Moreover, Jefferson, a prominent 
opponent of the national bank and an equally strong proponent of an anti-monopoly provision, did 
not rely on unenumerated rights or the Ninth Amendment in opposing the national bank.  Id. at 129-
30 & n. 417. Accord, Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1360-61; Banning, supra note 231, 
at 405-406.  Maryland also did not rely on individual rights or the Ninth Amendment in arguing the 
McCulloch case before the Supreme Court. See id. at 1373.    
 
233Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 390, quoting James Madison, WRITINGS, 
supra note 18, at 483; accord,  Garrett Ward Sheldon, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES 
MADISON 81 (2001) (treating Madison’s objection to the bank as based on its “interference with the 
powers of the states”). Even a strong proponent of using the Ninth Amendment to strictly construe 
federal power that would impact on individual interests, St. George Tucker, “saw the bank episode 
as an instance of violating the Tenth Amendment – not the Ninth Amendment.”  Lash, Inescapable 
Federalism, supra note 54, at 860 n. 223.  Tucker did not see the bank “as having anything to do 
with individual rights,” and therefore perceived only the need to protect “the rights of the states.”  Id.    
 
234See Griffin, supra note 87, at 299-300.  Griffin observes that the House and Senate were 
“crowded with framers and ratifiers,” id. at 299, and concludes that it is “very unlikely that President 
Washington, the ‘Father of our Country,’ would have signed the bill had it been obvious (as Barnett 
would have it) that the bank violated the original meaning of the Constitution.”  Id. at 300.   
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 also signed a subsequent law chartering a Second Bank of the United States, a decision that would 
seem especially unlikely had he viewed the law as violating a fundamental right of the people.235  A 
narrow reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause also became a prominent feature of nineteenth 
century states’ rights constitutionalism. 
B.  The Dispute Over the Alien and Sedition Acts 
 The infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, criminalizing sharp criticism of government as 
seditious libel, “precipitated the most serious constitutional crisis in the period after ratification.”236  
It led to the adoption of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which “drew on the 
anticonsolidationist rhetoric that had defined dissenting constitutional discourse since 
ratification.”237  Although the text of the Tenth Amendment does not appear to offer any special 
protection to states, beyond what already appears in article I, Section 8,238 it came to be viewed by 
                                                 
235See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 102-03 
(15th ed. 2004); SHELDON, supra note 233, at 106-09.  Strikingly, one whose views are widely cited 
in support of the fundamental rights construction of the Ninth Amendment, James Wilson, was just 
as adamant that there was power to create a national bank – a view he contended for even under the 
Articles of Confederation.  
 
236CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 230.   For useful summaries of the 
debate over the Alien & Sedition Acts, see Kurt T. Lash, James Madison’s Celebrated Report of 
1800: The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 167 (2006) [hereinafter 
cited as Report of 1800]; McAffee, Federal System, supra note 129, at 130-38. 
 
237CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 240.   
 
238See the discussion of Madison’s presentation of the Tenth Amendment, at supra notes 
207-09 and accompanying text.  Randolph objected that the amendment “does not appear to me to 
have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every particular 
state, as to what is delegated.”  Letter to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 Documentary 
History of the Constitution of the United States of America: 1786-1870, at 222, 223 (Dept. Of State 
ed., 1905), cited in Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 172 n. 60.   
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 many as “expressing a rule of narrow, or strict, construction of federal power.”239  We have seen that 
Madison relied on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to justify his opposition to the bill creating a 
national bank and as requiring a fairly strict construction of federal powers;240 indeed, Madison read 
the Ninth Amendment as “a rule of strict construction in order to preserve the principle announced 
by the Tenth Amendment.”241  Other commentators, including St. George Tucker, were satisfied that 
“the Tenth Amendment itself expressed a rule of strict construction.”242  Lash concludes: “[A]fter 
1800 and for the next 150 years, courts and commentators cited both the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments as expressing rules of strict construction of federal power.”243 
 Professor Cornell offered these observations:  
In both cases, Jefferson and Madison asserted that the protection of individual liberty 
depended upon preserving the balance of power between the states and the federal 
government.  States’ rights and individual rights continued to be linked in opposition 
constitutional discourse.  The two documents also adopted the compact theory of 
federalism, in which the states were cast as the original parties of the compact that 
created the Union.244  
 
 In support of the Virginia Resolutions, Madison offered the view that the challenged act 
                                                 
239Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 168.   See also id. at 170-172. 
 
240For a useful review of Madison’s congressional speech opposing the bank, see Lash, 
Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 172-75. 
 
241Id. at 177.   
 
242Id. at 178.  Lash reports that “[a]ccording to Tucker, under the Tenth Amendment, the 
Constitution ‘is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of state may be 
drawn in question.’”  Id.   
 
243Id.  
 
244CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 240. 
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 exercises “a power not delegated by the Constitution.”245  In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 
he contended that  
it will be proper to recollect that, the federal government being composed of powers 
specifically granted, with reservation of all others to the states or to the people, the 
positive authority under which the Sedition Act could be passed must be produced by 
those who assert its constitutionality.246 
 
The result of Madison’s Tenth Amendment-based argument for strict construction of federal power 
was that Madison’s Report of 1800 “became a foundational document for nineteenth-century 
advocates of states’ rights.”247 
 The principle of a government of limited and enumerated powers continued to be perceived 
as both securing the autonomy of state and local governments, but also as protecting rights.   In his 
Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson stated that  
“the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people”; and that, no 
power over the freedom of religion, freedom of speech, or freedom of the press, being 
                                                 
245Id.  Lash points out that Madison relied on the Tenth Amendment “which declares, that the 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people.”  Lash,  Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182 
(citing Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (1800), in Writings  608 (Jack N. Rakove 
ed., 1999).   
 
246James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 Elliot’s Debates, supra 
note 24, at 546, 561.   Professor Cornell observed that a leading congressional opponent, Albert 
Gallatin, contended that the only way to prevent the subversion of the Constitution was to interpret it 
in strict terms.  “In doubtful circumstances the language of the text was to be construed so as to limit 
power, not increase it.”  CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 232.  Gallatin even 
referred to “strict adherence” to the terms of the First Amendment. Id.  
 
247Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182.  Some have found it almost startling that 
“the Federalist Alien and Sedition Acts” provoked Madison “to advocate a states’ rights position,” 
that would be widely perceived as inconsistent with “the understanding of Madison the founder.”  
Dry,  The Antifederalists and the Constitution, in ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 100, at 41.   
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 delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, 
all lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to the 
state or to the people.248 
 
As the debate turned in part on the meaning and implications of rights found in the First 
Amendment, its opponents argued for a broad reading of the First Amendment, as well as a  narrow 
construction of federal power, without offering a separate argument that the law was “improper” 
(thus violating the Necessary and Proper Clause) or violated the Ninth Amendment.  Another 
consequence of the debate is “that Madison’s Tenth Amendment-based argument against the Acts 
had the effect of eclipsing the Ninth as the core constitutional provision requiring the strict 
construction of federal power.”249 
C.  The Commentaries of St. George Tucker and the Ninth Amendment 
 
 In the early years of the American republic, concerns that the national government be one of 
“limited” powers, thus preserving both personal and states’ rights, became  important themes in the 
constitutional thought of Jeffersonian republicans.250  Perhaps the first major constitutional 
commentator, St. George Tucker, a Jeffersonian republican,251 believed that the Bill of Rights “was 
                                                 
248Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), in 5 THE FOUNDERS 
CONSTITUTION 131 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987).   
249Lash, Report of 1800, supra note 235, at 182.   
 
250Clyde N. Wilson, Foreward, in TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at xi.  
 
251Wilson sees Tucker as “the exponent of Jeffersonian republicanism.”  Id. at xii (emphasis 
added).  Accord, David Thomas Konig, St. George Tucker and the Limits of States’ Rights 
Constitutionalism:   Understanding the Federal Compact in the Early Republic, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1279, 1294 (2006) (describing Tucker as an “ardent Jeffersonian”); Robert M. Cover, Book 
Review, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1475 , 1476 (1970) (reviewing ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, reprint ed.. 1969) 
(asserting that Tucker’s volumes “stand as a singular example of an attempt to translate Jeffersonian 
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 to reassert the limited nature of the new government’s powers and their dependence solely on the 
delegation of the people of the several sovereign states.”252  As an advocate of a state-compact 
theory of the Constitution,253  Tucker clearly held a “state-centered perspective.”254  Like other 
states’ rights commentators of his era, Tucker held the view that “the people” (not in general but 
those of the several states) had conferred powers on the federal government, “but only those 
expressly delegated.”255    
 Tucker underscored that the powers of the federal government under the Constitution “are 
limited,” while “the states, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and 
independent jurisdictions.”256  Without question Tucker uses both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 
to justify a strict construction of federal powers and does so to secure the rights both of the states and 
of American citizens.257  The issue that divides commentators concerns whether Tucker’s strict 
                                                                                                                                                                   
political theory into law,” and concluding that “[n]o other commentator of such pure Jeffersonian 
pedigree and persuasion ever wrote”).       
 
252Wilson, in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55,  at xii.   
 
253Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1350; Cover, supra note 251, at 1488.  
 
254G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 86  
(ab. ed. 1991). 
 
255Konig, supra note 250, at 1299.   
 
256TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 93.  To Tucker it was clear that 
“state governments not only retain every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated to the United 
States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, but they are constituent and necessary 
parts of the federal government.”  Id. at 91.   
 
257Professor Cornell summarized Tucker’s views this way: 
 
The protection of individual liberty, according to this view, could be 
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 construction of federal power, at least under the Ninth Amendment, centered on securing individual 
natural rights, or was at least equally, if not exclusively, to the end of preventing an expansive 
reading of national authority, to the detriment of state autonomy.258  Lash contends that “both the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments have their roots in the state ratification conventions, which called for 
provisions expressly limiting the construction of federal power to preserve the autonomy of the 
states.”259  Accordingly, “[i]n his Bank speech, Madison presented the Ninth Amendment as a rule 
of construction that preserves the principle enshrined in the Tenth.”260   
                                                                                                                                                                  
 Professor Lash observes that under the federal Constitution retaining a right generally “meant 
leaving the matter to state control (assuming the Constitution did not also expressly bind the states in 
 
accomplished only in a properly balanced federal system in which the federal 
government was limited to those powers expressly delegated by the Constitution.  
The only means for protecting the integrity of the federal system was to adhere to a 
philosophy of strict construction.  By limiting the scope of federal authority to the 
narrow grant that the states had made during ratification, federalism and liberty would 
be preserved. 
 
CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS, supra note 215, at 273.    
 
258Compare Barnett,  The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, at 69-71 (reading Tucker as 
asserting that the Ninth Amendment “provides a rule of construction” when “liberty” is at stake), 
and BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 242 (Tucker was clear that “the end of constitutional 
construction is the protection of individual liberty”), with Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 
54, at 815-17 (asserting that the two goals – of preventing enlarged power and securing retained 
rights – “were inextricably linked”).  At least some who concur with Professor Lash – of which I am 
one – perceive the rights “retained” as those secured by a reading of federal powers that preserves 
some “state autonomy.”    
 
259Lash, St. George Tucker, supra note 85, at 1351.  The conventions, according to Lash, 
perceived the Constitution as needing “a rule preventing unduly broad construction of enumerated 
federal authority–a means of ensuring that the people of the individual states would retain significant 
autonomy over those matters thought best left to local control.”  Id. at 1355-56. 
 
260Id. at 1360. 
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 the same matter).”261  Thus even though the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a 
law “respecting an establishment of religion,” states were free to establish religion in the decades 
following adoption of the Bill of Rights.262  Madison’s use of the Ninth Amendment to justify strict 
construction of federal power in the bank controversy, notwithstanding the absence of a fundamental 
rights issue, confirms that the Ninth Amendment came to be conceived as a guarantee of state and 
local autonomy and a restrained construction of federal power.263 
 It does not appear that Tucker himself conceived of  his reliance on the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments as consisting of the securing of unnamed rights, independently defined and enforced.  
In his 1803 commentary, Tucker suggested that “the disquisition of social rights where there is no 
text to resort to, for their explanation, is a task, equally above ordinary capacities, and incompatible 
with the ordinary pursuits, of the body of the people.”264   In defending the Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights, Tucker concluded that “[b]y reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws, every man of 
the meanist capacity and understanding may learn of his own rights, and know when they are 
violated.”265  Tucker is clearly committed to the strict construction of federal power, but does not 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
261Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 831.   
 
262Id.   
 
263See supra notes 206-231 and accompanying text.  
 
2641 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, APPENDIX TO BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES:   WITH NOTES OF 
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 154-55 (Philadelphia: William Young Birch and 
Abraham Small, 1803) [hereinafter cited as APPENDIX TO BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES].   
 
265TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 246.   
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 appear as a likely candidate for explicating implied fundamental rights.   
 Tucker’s commitment to the written Constitution is a standard view of the founding era; it is 
also, as Professor Cover observed, exemplary of a view that amounted to constitutional 
positivism.266  That Tucker, despite his commitment to (and interest in) rights, subscribed to a 
constitutionally positivist view, is clear from his record as a judge.  Among other things, Tucker 
wrote one of the opinions in Hudgens v. Wright,267 disapproving of Judge Wythe’s dictum that read 
Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause – stating the “free and equal principle” – as invalidating the entire 
institution of human slavery.268  From any reasonable positivist perspective, it is difficult to quarrel 
with the judgment of the court in Hudgens, given that the language of the proposed Inherent Rights 
Clause was amended purposely to avoid threatening slavery.269  
                                                 
266See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. 
 
2671 Hen. & M. 134, 11 Va. 134 (Va.), 1806 WL 562 (Va.). 
 
268The case is usefully discussed in WHITE, supra note 254, at 685-87;   COVER, JUSTICE 
ACCUSED,  supra note 134, at 51-55; Paul Finkleman, The Dragon St. George Could Not Slay: 
Tucker’s Plan to End Slavery, 47 Will. & Mary L. Rev. 1213, 1213-216 (2006); Cover, supra note 
251, at 1493.    
 
269See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text.  Tucker’s  state-compact theory almost 
certainly would mean that “states’ rights” would be his priority in a clash between them and human 
rights.  Consider these comments about Jefferson: 
 
In 1819-1820, the nation experienced the crisis of the Missouri Compromise.  In the midst of 
this crisis, it was clear to Jefferson that the threatened rejection of Missouri’s bid for statehood 
unless it abandoned its slave system or opened its border to free blacks represented a violation of the 
original federal bargain and threatened to undermine Missouri’s sovereign power to determine its 
own domestic affairs.  PAULINE MAIER,   AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 185 (1998).  See Thomas B. McAffee, Does the Federal Constitution Incorporate the 
Declaration of Independence?, 1 Nev. L.J. 138, 152 n. 65 (2001).   See also DAVID N. MAYER, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288-89 (1994).  
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 D.   The Other Rights “Retained” by State Constitutions 
 It has become common to assert that the Ninth Amendment could not have been designed to 
prevent a bill of rights from undercutting the Constitution’s enumerated powers scheme, given that 
nineteenth century state constitutions often contained what are often called “mini-Ninth 
Amendments.”270  Most recently, Professor Barnett has contended that the state provisions 
“undercut” the view that the Ninth Amendment was intended “to underscore the limited nature of 
federal power.”271  To date, however, no one has responded to the analysis provided in 2001 that 
provided historical understanding and explanation for the state constitutional equivalents of the 
Ninth Amendment.272   
 In the single case in which a law was invalidated based solely on reliance on such a state 
constitutional provision, In re J.L. Dorsey,273 the state court read the provision simply as requiring 
legislative power to “be derived from an express grant in the constitution.”274  In short, the court 
                                                 
270JOHN HART ELY,  DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 203 N. 87 (1980), seems to have been the 
first to make this argument in print.  Accord, Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 171, 187 (1992); Yoo, supra note 49, at 1008-09.  
 
271BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 243.   Barnett does not seek to reconcile this 
assertion with his own strict construction of federal power whenever it impacts on rights.  He does 
suggest that such provisions show that the Ninth Amendment was a “declaration of rights,” and not 
“a limitation on enumerated powers.”  Id. at 244.  Yet he does not refer to a single case simply 
finding implied limitations on federal powers in favor of rights.   
 
272See McAffee,   Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 771-792 (Part entitled “The Other 
Rights ‘Retained’ by State Constitutions”).  For a similar analysis, with similar conclusions, based 
on federal Ninth Amendment decisions, see Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 80.  
 
2737 Port. *293 (Ala. 2838). 
 
274Id. *333.  Of course, in the process the Alabama court also asserted that the state’s 
constitution secures “all these inherent, unalienable rights” from intrusion by the “law making 
 79 
 read the provision as stating that,  just as the federal Ninth was designed to secure the natio
government’s enumerated powers scheme, state legislative power was similarly limited to power 
expressly enumerated.  Unsurprisingly, Dorsey was accompanied by a dissent that stated the view 
that dominated the ratification-era bill of rights debate on the subject of state legislative power.
nal 
                                                                                                                                                                  
275   
Perhaps of greater importance is that “the Supreme Court of Alabama has expressly and specifically 
rejected the reasoning that supported the holding in Dorsey.”276  Most importantly perhaps, in the 
twentieth century state courts did not rely on Ninth Amendment equivalents to help justify decisions 
securing unenumerated fundamental rights, such that there were no state court decisions to rely on 
when Justice Goldberg pointed to the federal Ninth Amendment to justify his concurring in Griswold 
v. Connecticut.277 
   VI.  
 The Ninth Amendment and Modern Positivism 
 
 We have noted that advocates of fundamental, unenumerated rights often write as though it is 
modern “positivists,” who are frequently moral skeptics, who comprise the enemies of the proper 
historical construction of the Ninth Amendment.  They also write as though there were a fairly clear-
cut dichotomy between advocates of constitutional positivism and advocates of a constitutional 
 
power.”  Id. at *324.  The case is treated in some depth in Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts 
Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 364-66. 
 
275Dorsey, 7 Port. at *387, *401 (Collier, C.J., dissenting)  (“[W]hile the constitutuion of the 
United States is an enabling charter, the constitution of the States are instruments of restraint and 
limitation upon powers already plenary.”).   
 
276Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Court Over Constitution, supra note 152, at 366 (citing 
Johnson v. Robinson, 192 So. 412, 415 (Ala. 1939).   
 
277381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).  
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 jurisprudence based on natural law and natural rights.  There is little doubt that issues related to the 
presumed difficulties in identifying and justifying reliance on natural rights that cannot be found in 
constitutional text play a role in motivating some to oppose open-ended constitutional adjudication 
based on the Ninth Amendment.   But when the question is posed as to whether “we can reconcile 
our natural law past with our textualist present,” and “whether we even want to,”278 it is not at all 
clear that such a dichotomy accurately describes either modern views or competing readings of the 
history.279   The point is illustrated in the interpretive views offered by two leading Ninth 
Amendment theorists who have debated over the original meaning of the amendment.  
A.   Randy E. Barnett  
 Professor Barnett, to use one example, appears to be genuinely committed to the idea that the 
Ninth Amendment protects all the natural liberty claims of individuals–all the “rights” that the 
framers perceived them as having brought with them to the social contract that is governed by the 
Constitution.280   But notice that Professor Barnett’s interpretation is based on the historical and 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
278Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 222 (1992).  
 
279It is now clear that Professor Sherry has opted for constitutional textualism, albeit without 
rejecting a broad (if pragmatic) reading of the Ninth Amendment.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & 
Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The Misguided Quest for Constitutional 
Foundations 138-39 (2002) (critiquing Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the American 
Constitution).  See McAffee, Foundations, supra note 133.   
 
280Indeed, one senses that Barnett does not really view the text we call the Ninth Amendment 
as particularly crucial to reaching the conclusion that he does.  Thus he suggests that if “courts are 
bound by the original meaning of the constitutional text,” and yet the text “does not provide any 
protection of unenumerated rights,” those embracing such an interpretation “may have won the 
constitutional battle, yet lost the legitimacy war.”  Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative, supra note 
115, at 111.  This would be because “[t]hey would have succeeded only in proving that the 
constitution now in effect does not provide what it must provide to make laws that are justified and 
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 textual claims that the framers identified the other rights “retained” in the Ninth Amendment by 
reference to social contract political theory.  If  this historical and textual perspective were not 
enough of itself to make Professor Barnett a “positivist,” it seems clear that his conclusion that the 
federal Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment, did not apply as limits on the powers of state and 
local government would be sufficient.281  A result, he observes, was that “at the founding period and 
for decades thereafter, the propriety of state laws received minimal federal scrutiny.”282  The 
question raised  is:   if the rights we retain in entering the social contract “entail enforceable claims 
on other persons (including those who call themselves ‘government officials’),”283 why would these 
rights limitations not apply to local and state government officials?  Moreover, Barnett has been 
emphatic that the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights held to the principle that   
those who enter into social compacts cannot deprive or divest their posterity of these 
natural rights regardless of the powers they may delegate to government.   They are, 
in other words, inalienable.284    
 
And according to Barnett, the framers viewed these constitutional principles as part of the supreme 
                                                                                                                                                                   
bind in conscience.”  Id.  Though he nowhere explicitly admits it, Barnett is effectively contending 
that virtually every American constitution – those governing in the various states – are completely 
illegitimate.   
 
281Barnett, The Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 72 (“one should not lose sight of the fact 
that originally the Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, was applicable only to the 
federal government;” the Fourteenth Amendment “substantially altered the constitutional structure”); 
id. at 74 (“there was no federal jurisdiction to protect the rights retained by the people from 
infringement by state governments” until the Fourteenth Amendment).  See supra note 35.   
 
282BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 320.   
 
283Barnett, Getting Normative, supra note 115, at 106.    
 
284Barnett The Ninth Amendment, supra note 27, 40.  
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 law of the land, and not as a mere restatement of unenforceable political principle.     
 The only way to justify Barnett’s idea that the Bill of Rights, and the Ninth Amendment, did 
not limit the powers of the states, is by concluding that Justice John Marshall correctly decided 
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore.285  If Justice Marshall was right, however, it was as a matter of 
positive constitutional law, as is illustrated by the existence of so-called Barron contrarians during 
the decades following the decision, who often relied on the “declaratory” nature of rights found in 
the federal Bill of Rights to justify their decision to ignore its holding.286  But if the Ninth 
Amendment refers to inalienable natural rights, Professor Barnett at least owes readers an 
explanation as to why it limits only the national government, given the argument that the amendment 
embodies a decision to “vest these rights in the people, rather than in any government.”287  There is a 
                                                 
28532 U.S. (7 Pet. 243 (1833).  For defenses of Barron, see DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN 
B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 752   (2d 
ed. 2004) (finding “that the Court is correct on this point, as a glance at any of the better histories of 
the period will confirm”); Thomas B. McAffee, Reed Dickerson’s Originalism – What it Contributes 
to Contemporary Constitutional Debate, 16 S.I.U. L.J. 617, 651-57 (1992). 
 
286AMAR, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 13, at 145-156.  Professor Amar 
observes that: 
 
From the 1830s on, antislavery crusaders began to develop, contra Barron, a 
“declaratory” interpretation of the Bill of Rights that viewed the Bill, not as creating 
new or merely federalism-based rules applicable only against federal officials, but as 
affirming and declaring preexisting higher-law norms applicable to all governments, 
state as well as federal.  According to this declaratory view, for example, although the 
First Amendment directly regulated Congress, it also affirmed a preexisting right to 
free expression. 
 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation, Reconstruction, and Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in THE 
NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 163, 165.     
 
287Calvin R. Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, in 1 
RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 291, 335.   
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 large group of legal scholars who have read the Ninth Amendment as applying by its terms to 
limiting the powers of the states.288 
 Barnett correctly concludes, of course, that Justice Marshall was right in holding that the Bill 
of Rights was never intended to limit the powers of state governments.   It is noteworthy, moreover, 
that Madison sought to add a couple of amendments that would limit the powers of the states in 
favor of individual rights,289 and that none of these were adopted.290  Most of the framers of the 
Constitution not only perceived the doctrine of popular sovereignty as embodying sufficient 
authority for “the People” to decide whether to “retain” or “surrender” popular rights,291 but 
thoughtful early Americans held the view that “the People” of each and every state were empowered 
to determine whether any given right would be retained or surrendered to the state as a matter of 
state constitutional law.292  
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
288E.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
UNNAMED (1997); Bennet B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, in 1 RIGHTS RETAINED, 
supra note 48, at 107, 114-30; Norman G. Redlich, Are There Certain Rights . . . Retained by the 
People?, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 787, 805-806 (1962).  
 
289Madison would have added to article I, section 10:   “No State shall violate the equal rights 
of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.”  I Annals of the 
Congress of the United States (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).   Madison’s proposals are also at 1 
BARNETT, RIGHTS RETAINED, supra note 48, at 55.  That Madison was insightful and recognized the 
need to limit the states if the rights of the people were to be secured is clear in the history.  See 
McAffee, supra note 204, at 655-56 (noting that Thomas Tudor Tucker opposed Madison on the 
ground that “the states were interfered with too much already”).   
 
290See McAffee, supra note 204, at 656 (setting forth basis for conclusion that “Madison’s 
attempt to add to the limits imposed on the states failed”).   
 
291See supra note 91 and accompanying text.   
 
292See supra note 173 and accompanying text (referring to Professor Lutz’s amply supported 
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  Strange as it may seem, Professor Barnett asserts quite confidently that the right to “alter and 
abolish” a form of government deemed to be “adverse or inadequate to the purpose of its 
institution,” is among mankind’s “unalienable” rights secured by the Ninth Amendment.293  Beyond 
the right to alter or abolish, Barnett contended that the Ninth Amendment’s “retained rights” include 
at least the right to religious freedom, the right to defend life, liberty and property, the right 
emigrate, the right of assembly, and the right to free speech.294  The conclusion: it is clear to Barnett 
that “[n]o originalist of any stripe should accept less than the protection of all these liberties.”295  
There is only one problem:   there cannot possibly be both a strongly – and invariably, given the idea 
of “inalienability” –  protected right to religious freedom as well as a strongly protected right for the 
community  to “alter or abolish” a  form of government the community has come to deem 
inadequate to the purpose of its institution.296    
 Professor Barnett does not appear even to be aware that there is an unresolved tension 
                                                                                                                                                                   
claim that state constitutions’ drafters “assumed that government had all power except for specific 
prohibitions contained in a bill of rights”).   
 
293BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92 at 257-58, citing 1 Annals 452 (Madison’s proposed 
amendment to be added to the preamble).    Barnett does not explain how to reconcile his own 
reliance on the collective right to “alter or abolish” government with the view that the “consent of 
the governed” is simply a fiction that does not contribute to the legitimacy of government.  See supra 
note 92 and accompanying text.   
 
294Id.   
 
295Id. at 258.   
 
296As an illustration, Professor Lash observes that “although the First Amendment prohibits 
any law respecting an establishment of religion, states remained free to establish religion as they 
pleased in the decades following the adoption of the Bill of Rights (and they did).”  Lash, 
Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 831. 
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 between his insistence that the Ninth Amendment refers to inalienable natural rights and his equally 
adamant claim that the inquiry called for merely authorizes “supplementation” of the Constitution’s 
“express terms in ways that do not contradict their original meaning.”297   If one takes seriously the 
task of engaging in the natural rights adjudication suggested by Barnett’s reading of the Ninth 
Amendment, it would raise doubts about the constitutional validity of all morally controversial 
enactments of positive law, including provisions of our written Constitution.  Consequently if a 
Supreme Court justice were convinced that “equal representation of jurisdictions of unequal 
population violates the principle of one person, one vote,” Professor Barnett should explain why that 
justice should not hold that “the equal representation of the fifty states in the Senate” is 
unconstitutional.298  Barnett has to date not supplied anything approaching an adequate ground for 
reading a provision dedicated to “inalienable liberty rights”  as one that creates an “exception” that 
invariably upholds positive law that happened also to be written – and ratified – as fundamental 
law.299   
 Sooner or later, we must choose which is more central to our constitutionalism: (1) the 
content of the decision made, which might include the precise elements of the rights characterized as 
“inalienable,” or (2) the “authority” to make the decision about the appropriate content of our rights 
and the appropriate limits on government power, an authority traditionally thought to be held by the 
                                                 
297BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 108.   
 
298The example is borrowed from Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of 
Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 97 (1988).    For analysis of an attempted 
response to this objection, see McAffee, Utopian Vision, supra note 129, at 534-47.  
 
299For similar analysis of another advocate of the unenumerated fundamental rights 
construction of the Ninth Amendment, see McAffee, Foundations, supra note 155, at _____. 
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 sovereign people as they ratified (or chose not to ratify) proposed constitutions.300  If we choose to 
construe apparently open-ended rights clauses as enforceable at the highest level of generality, it is a 
decision to be ruled by judges.301  Some contend that it is a matter of choosing to be governed by the 
natural rights we properly have and deserve.  But others, such a Professor Soper, observe that when 
judges feel free to implement natural law, “the system remains positivist in the most significant 
sense, with the judge simply serving as the sovereign in place of the legislature.”302  Read 
consistently with the history of the inherent rights clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights, the question 
is not simply whether a right is properly understood to be “inalienable,” but whether there was 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
300As I once observed, 
 
[t]he very concept of inalienable rights is one that limits, at least in moral and 
political theory, the power of the people.  But the founders were just as clear that the 
power of sovereignty is unlimited as they were that there are inalienable rights.  So 
we now face a fundamental question: we can treat the founders as speaking the 
sentiments of an unlimited sovereign people on the applicability of a particular right, 
or we can choose to view their powers as substantively limited by the “inalienable” 
right–but we cannot have it both ways. 
 
McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37, at 780-81.   
 
301See, e.g., Rosen, Flag Burning Amendment, supra note 107 (contending that Ninth 
Amendment is properly read as invalidating proposed amendment authorizing flag desecration laws).  
But see Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 358 (taking 
opposing view).    
 
302Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2393, 2415 
(1992).   Many assume that since Jefferson recognized “inalienable” rights, his priority would be on 
the rights that cannot be given up.  But Jefferson “accepted that ‘every man, and every body of men 
on earth, possesses the right of self-government,’” and that “‘the law of the majority is the natural 
law of every society of men . . . [and] natural rights, may be abridged or modified in its exercise, by 
their own consent, or by the law of those who depute them.’” Shain, Rights Natural and Civil in the 
Declaration of Independence, in THE NATURE OF RIGHTS, supra note 91, at 116, 126 (citing 17 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 195 (Julian Boyd et al. ed. 1950–).     
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 sufficiently widespread agreement that it should be secured by the written constitution as a limitation 
on the exercise of government power.  The framers did not equate constitutional and “inalienable” 
rights, and they distinguished moral and legal claims.303  
 It is also true, of course, as Barnett notes, that “state court judges began to scrutinize the 
propriety of state legislation under the ‘law of the land’ provisions in state constitutions to ensure 
that such legislation served the general public, as opposed to a faction or special interest.”304  But 
substantive due process decisions have been controversial all the way through American history, and 
are not generally thought to embody the original meaning of the due process clause.305  More 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
303For a general critique of basing constitutionalism on the idea of “inalienable rights,” see 
McAffee, Utopian Vision, supra note 129.     
 
304BARNETT, RESTORING, supra note 92, at 320 n. 3.    For additional perspective on 
Nineteenth Century substantive due process decision-making see Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, 
supra note 147, at 371-92.   Despite being an advocate for some substantive due process decision-
making, Professor Conkle concludes that the evidence is against the view that substantive due 
process was “embraced by the original, objective public meaning of the clause,” and concludes that 
its values “emerge from a process of nonoriginalist decisionmaking.”  ‘Daniel O. Conkle, Three 
Theories of Substantive Due Process, 84 N. C. L. REV. 63, 77-78 (2006).   
 
305Early in this decade I wrote: 
 
Even a modern advocate of unenumerated rights has concluded that “the very 
phrase ‘substantive due process’ teeters on self-contradiction,” and hence “provides 
neither a sound starting point nor a directional push to proper legal analysis.”  Akhil 
Reed Amar, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 123 
(2000).  See also id. at 122-23 (describing recent unenumerated rights case as 
“invoking the nonmamallian whale of substantive due process, a phantasmogorical 
beat conjured up by judges without clear textual warrant”); Charles Black, Jr., A New 
Birth of Freedom 3 (1997) (describing substantive due process as “paradoxical, even 
oxymoronic”).  Professor Black is also not known as an opponent of unenumerated 
rights.   
 
Thomas B. McAffee, The Constitution as Based on the Consent of the Governed–Or, Should We 
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 centrally, however, it remains true that the view of state legislative power that dominated the 1787-
1788 debate over ratification has remained the predominant view in America’s state courts.  Typical 
is Louisiana’s assertion that “a state constitution’s provisions are not grants of power but instead are 
limitations on the otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its Legislature,” 
which “may enact any legislation that the state constitution does not prohibit.”306  And Kansas stated 
that “[w]here the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question is, therefore, not whether the 
act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.”307   
 The real problem confronting Professor Barnett, however, is not his positivism, but his 
history.  The notion that valid moral claims, or natural rights, might appropriately limit legislative 
power, seems on its face to receive some support from Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause.308  But the 
Inherent Rights Clause itself was almost never viewed as stating enforceable limits on legislative 
power, and, consistent with Lockean tradition favoring legislative supremacy,309 the general rule that 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 80 Ore. L. Rev. 1245, 1273 n. 130 (2001).  
 
306Bd of Dirs. v. All Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. 1988).   
 
307State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978).   A decision like 
Kennedy is what explains Oliver Wendell Holmes’ quip that, for him, when the issue concerns the 
scope of state legislative power, “the question always is where do you find the prohibition–not, 
where do you find the power.” VIII OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: TROUBLED 
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 181 (1993) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., to James B. Thayer, Nov. 1, 1893).   The opposite view, in Holmes’ mind, was 
“dangerous and wrong.”  Id.   See Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, 
supra note 161, at 385-86. 
 
308For scholars who read the Inherent Rights Clause as providing for enforceable natural 
rights, see supra note 147.   
 
309See, e.g, supra note 133 and accompanying text.  Cf.  Paul Peterson, Antifederalist 
Thought in Contemporary American Politics, in ANTIFEDERALISM, supra note 100, at 111, 127 
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 the states’ legislatures held plenary power, subject only to specific limitations spelled out in the state 
constitutions’ Declarations of Rights, came to be understood as requiring power-constraining texts if 
rights were to be protected..310  Madison sought to supply such texts in his proposed federal Bill of 
Rights, and the equivalent of Virginia’s Inherent Rights Clause is precisely what Madison proposed 
for a “prefix” to the Constitution that retreated to hortatory language and was not intended to be an 
operative provision of the Constitution.311  Notwithstanding claims offered by Professor Barnett, the 
Inherent Rights Clause had nothing to do with the Ninth Amendment, which was designed to 
reaffirm the indirect protection of rights provided by the system of enumerated and limited powers – 
this is why it became, with the Tenth Amendment, one of the twin guardians of federalism.   
B.   Kurt T. Lash 
 Professor Lash and Professor Barnett sometimes appear to hold substantially the same basic 
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment.   Each has stated that the Ninth Amendment’s reference to 
other rights includes the natural rights referred to as “inherent” in the Virginia Bill of Rights, and 
each describes his view as embodying a “Federalist” reading of the amendment that favors relatively 
strict construction of national powers, especially when the exercise of national powers threatened the 
other rights secured by the Ninth Amendment.   Each agrees that the other rights “retained” by the 
people, against the national government, included the uniquely individual rights the people are 
appropriately viewed as holding, based on nature (or sometimes custom).   But Lash is insistent that 
                                                                                                                                                                   
(observing that Federalist proponents of the Constitution favored a strong executive “to guard 
against the very system of legislative supremacy favored by the Antifederalists”).   
 
310Frost, Klein-Levine, & McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions, supra note 161, at 362-69. 
 
311See supra notes146-149 and accompanying texts.   
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 the other retained rights of greatest importance were the rights held collectively by the people of 
each state: 
In addition to individual rights were collective rights, those held by the people as a 
collective entity. The most famous of these is announced in the Declaration of 
Independence, which declared the people's unalienable right to alter or abolish their 
form of government.  In the period immediately following the Revolution, all these 
rights ran against one's own state government312  
 
Thus Lash contends that “[a]t the time of the Founding, it was possible to embrace natural rights and 
a strong belief in the collective right of the people to local self-government.”313    
 So when North Carolina proposed both a “natural rights” provision and the rough equivalent 
of Article II of the Articles of Confederation, Lash concludes that the “approach conceives of 
retained rights in a collective manner, rather than an individual Libertarian sense.   Rights and 
powers not delegated to the federal government remain under the collective control of the people of 
the individual states.”314  Lash therefore perceives Barnett’s interpretation of the Ninth Amendment 
as somewhat narrowly “referring to nothing more than individual rights.”315   By contrast, Lash 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
312Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 826-27.  Indeed, Lash supplies a lengthy 
quotation from the work of St. George Tucker directly connecting the right to alter or abolish a form 
of government with the Ninth Amendment, id. at 859-60 – a quotation that, as he put it, “explodes 
Professor Barnett’s claim that ‘no direct or indirect evidence’ supports Amar’s claim about the Ninth 
Amendment protecting this collective right of the people.”  Id. at 860 n. 217, citing Barnett, The 
Ninth Amendment, supra note 32, at 22.     
 
313Lash, Lost Original Meaning, supra note 45, at 363.  Illustrative was that the federal right 
not to have an “established” religion simply did not apply to the states, which frequently did 
establish religions.  See supra note 260 and accompanying text.   
 
314Id. at 364. 
 
315Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 824.   Acknowledging that Barnett 
sometimes states he believes in “collective rights,” Lash contends that “his overall theory makes 
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 underscores his agreement with Professor Barnett that the popular (and collective) right to “alter or 
abolish” the form of government one lives under is among the other rights “retained” by the Ninth 
Amendment.316  But it is also clear that he understands what this means and implies.   
 One implication is that “the concepts of ‘powers’ and ‘rights’ are inextricably linked; a 
delegated right is an extension of power, and a retained right is a reservation of power.”317  
Moreover, even the Tenth Amendment’s reference to the “retained rights of the states,” Lash’s 
research reveals, acted as “a shorthand reference to the retained right of the people in their respective 
states to local self-government.”318  The collective right of the people to self-government within the 
states would thus mean that the Ninth Amendment would secure a state’s right to determine whether 
a given individual right should be secured by the state’s constitution.  This collective right, 
moreover, was undoubtedly limited to some degree by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the “degree 
of impact the Fourteenth Amendment has on the Ninth” is necessarily “based on an interpretation of 
the enumerated rights and powers of the Fourteenth.”319  In short, the disagreement between Barnett 
and Lash is ultimately a dispute over the proper reading of a positivist written Constitution that turns 
on which scholar has more accurately construed its text in historical context. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
such a reading impossible.”  Id.   
 
316See supra notes 291-294 and accompanying text.   
 
317Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 860.   
 
318Lash reports that Madison explained that “references to the rights of states can be 
understood as references to the sovereign people of a given state.”  Id. at 827 n. 88 (Citing James 
Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 6 The Writings of James Madison 348 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter Writings of Madison]. 
 
319Lash, Inescapable Federalism, supra note 54, at 879.  For an analogous view of the impact 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, see McAffee, Inalienable Rights, supra note 37. 
